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1 Introduction
One of the core tenets of nancial economics is the informativeness of market prices. The basic
argument is that prot opportunities in the nancial market will lead speculators to trade on
their information, incorporating it into prices and eliminating any mispricing. For example, if
speculators have negative private information about a stock, they will nd it protable to sell
the stock. This action will push down the price, reecting the speculatorsinformation.
A key reason why price informativeness is deemed important is that prices can a¤ect real
decisions the feedback e¤ect. Indeed, if prices are informative, it is natural to expect decision
makers, such as managers, directors, and activist investors, to use the information in prices to
guide actions that a¤ect rm value (such as investment). This paper shows that, if real decision
makers take advantage of price informativeness by learning from prices, this a¤ects speculators
incentives to trade on information and thus changes price informativeness in the rst place.
The basic idea is as follows. If decision makers use the information in the price to take more
informed actions, they will increase the value of the underlying asset. This increased asset
value raises a speculators prots from buying on positive information and lowers her prot
from selling on negative information, in some cases causing her to su¤er a loss. Taking this
e¤ect into account, the speculator may trade less on negative information, thus changing price
informativeness in an asymmetric way. In particular, bad news is less likely to be incorporated
into prices and a¤ect real decisions. Therefore, the market is not strong-form e¢ cient in the
Fama (1970) sense, in that private information is not reected in the price. However, it is
strong-form e¢ cient in the Jensen (1978) sense, in that a privately-informed investor cannot
earn prots by trading on her information.
A classic example of how information from the stock market can shape real decisions is
Coca-Colas attempted acquisition of Quaker Oats. On November 20, 2000, the Wall Street
Journal reported that Coca-Cola was in talks to acquire Quaker Oats. Shortly thereafter, Coca-
Cola conrmed such discussions. The market reacted negatively, sending Coca-Colas shares
down 8% on November 20 and 2% on November 21. Coca-Colas board rejected the acquisition
later on November 21, potentially due to the negative market reaction. The following day,
Coca-Colas shares rebounded 8%. Thus, speculators who had short-sold on the initial merger
announcement, based on the belief that the acquisition would destroy value, lost money 
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precisely the e¤ect modeled by this paper.1 In Section 3.5, we discuss another similar example
involving Hewlett Packards (HP) acquisition of Compaq.
We formalize and analyze this intuition in a tractable model that delivers closed-form solu-
tions, allowing the economic forces to be transparent. In particular, by studying versions of the
model both with and without feedback, we can understand precisely how the feedback e¤ect
changes trading behavior. Our model features a manager, who can either increase investment
(i.e., invest), decrease it (i.e., disinvest), or maintain the status quo. If the state of nature is
good (bad), the optimal action is to invest (disinvest). While the state is unobserved by the
manager, a speculator (such as a hedge fund) may be present in the market; if present, she
observes the state and may choose to trade on her private information. As in Kyle (1985), also
present is a noise trader and a market maker. The manager observes the trading in the market
and uses it to update his prior on the state. If his posterior is su¢ ciently positive (negative),
he invests (disinvests); if his prior is little changed, he maintains the status quo.
Our key result is that, in the presence of the feedback e¤ect i.e., when nancial market
trading is su¢ ciently informative to change the managers decision there is an asymmetry
between the speculators trading on positive and negative information. While the feedback
e¤ect reduces a speculators incentive to sell if the state is bad, it increases her incentive to
buy if the state is good. The intuition is that, when a speculator trades on information, she
improves the e¢ ciency of the rms decisions, regardless of the direction of her trade. If she sells
on negative information, she pushes down the price and conveys to the rm that its investment
opportunities are poor. As a result, the rm may disinvest, boosting its value by avoiding over-
investment and reducing the protability of selling. In contrast, buying on positive information
reveals that investment is protable, persuading the manager to invest more. This also increases
rm value, since expansion is the correct decision upon good investment opportunities, and thus
increases the protability of buying.
Formally, in the presence of feedback, there is a clear asymmetry in equilibrium outcomes,
whereby the range of parameters giving rise to an equilibrium where the speculator trades on
good news and not on bad news is a strict superset of the range giving rise to an equilibrium
1Our model predicts that speculators refrain from selling in expectation of deal cancelation, the direct
evidence of which is not empirically detectable. In the above example, speculators who sold might have expected
that the acquisition would go through due to managerial private benets. Hence, the example should be used to
demonstrate the losses incurred by speculators when a corrective action was unexpectedly adopted in response
to their selling.
3
where she trades on bad news and not on good news. Moreover, there is a range for which the
equilibrium is unique and involves the speculator buying on good news and not trading on bad
news. This equilibrium is no longer unique when feedback is not present, i.e. trading in the
nancial market is not su¢ ciently informative to change the managers investment decision. In
this no-feedback case, the equilibrium with buying and no selling exists over a smaller range
and always coincides with the equilibrium that features selling and no buying.
Even though the speculators trading behavior is asymmetric, it is not automatic that
the impact on prices will be. The market maker is rational and takes into account that the
speculator trades less on negative information, and so he adjusts his pricing function accordingly.
Therefore, it may seem that negative information should have the same absolute price impact
as positive information: the market maker knows that a moderate order ow can stem from
the speculator having negative information but choosing not to trade, and therefore should
decrease the price accordingly. We show that asymmetry in trading behavior does translate
into asymmetry in price impact. The crux is that the market maker cannot distinguish the case
of a speculator who has negative information but chooses to withhold it, from the case in which
she is absent. Thus, a moderate order ow which is consistent both with the speculator being
absent, and with her being negatively-informed and not trading does not lead to a large stock
price decrease, and so negative information has a smaller e¤ect on prices. Dening newsas
information received by the speculator (i.e. the speculator being present), our model implies
that bad news travels slowly: it leads to a smaller short-term price impact and potentially larger
long-run drift than good news. A common explanation for this phenomenon is that managers
possess value-relevant information and publicize good news more readily than bad news, because
they wish to boost the stock price (Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000)). Here, key information is
held by a rms investors rather than its managers, who publicizeit not through public news
releases, but by trading on it. Investors choose to disseminate bad news less readily than good
news due to the feedback e¤ect and its implications for trading prots.2
These stock return e¤ects are most likely around major corporate events, when important
decisions are taken such as an acquisition, a new product launch, or a change in strategy. That
these events, and thus the stock return e¤ects, do not necessarily happen on a day-to-day
2Another di¤erence is that Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) empirically nd a protable trading strategy incon-
sistent with market e¢ ciency. In our model, the market is semi-strong-form e¢ cient and so there is no protable
trading strategy. While bad news can lead to a larger long-run drift than good news, this result is conditional
upon the speculator being present, which is unobservable to a potential trader.
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basis does not take away from their importance. This is because these e¤ects occur exactly at
times when the stock price performs its utmost important role of a¤ecting real decisions and
allocating resources. Indeed, the asymmetric trading captured in our model generates important
real consequences. Since negative information is less incorporated into prices, it has a lower
e¤ect on management decisions. Thus, while positive net present value (NPV) projects will
be encouraged, some negative-NPV projects will not be canceled, leading to overinvestment
overall. In contrast to standard overinvestment theories based on the manager having private
benets (e.g., Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990), Zwiebel (1996)), here the manager is fully aligned
with rm value and there are no agency problems. The manager wishes to maximize rm value
by learning from prices, but is unable to do so since speculators refrain from revealing negative
information. Applied to M&A as well as organic investment, the theory may explain why M&A
appear to be excessiveand a large fraction of acquisitions destroy value (see, e.g., Andrade,
Mitchell, and Sta¤ord (2001)). While intuition would suggest that the market can prevent bad
acquisitions by communicating negative information to the manager, our model shows that it
may fail to do so due to the feedback e¤ect.
Our mechanism is based on the presence of a feedback e¤ect decision makers learn from
the market when deciding their actions. A common perception is that managers know more
about their own rms than outsiders (e.g. Myers and Majluf (1984)). While this perception
is plausible for internal information about the rm in isolation, optimal decisions also depend
on external information (such as market demand for a rms products, the future prospects
of the industry, or potential synergies with a target) which outsiders may possess more of.
For example, a potential acquirer hires investment bank advisors even though they have less
internal information, because they can add value on target selection. More importantly, we only
require that outside investors possess some information that the manager does not have; they
need not be more informed than the manager on an absolute basis. Luo (2005) provides large-
sample evidence that an acquisition is more likely to be canceled if the market reacts negatively,
particularly in cases where learning is more probable. Relatedly, Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang
(2012) demonstrate that a rms market price a¤ects the likelihood that it becomes a takeover
target, which may arise because potential acquirers learn from the market price. More broadly,
Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) show that the sensitivity of investment to price is higher
when the price contains more private information not known to managers.
The model also applies to decision makers other than the manager who aim to maximize
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rm value, such as a board or an activist investor: a low stock price may induce them to block a
bad investment or re an underperforming manager. In addition to corporate decision makers,
the model can also apply to regulators or policymakers who also a¤ect security values: low stock
or bond prices may trigger a bailout. Moreover, the applicability of our theory goes beyond
nancial markets to other economic contexts such as prediction markets, which can provide key
information to policymakers (Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004)).
This paper contributes to the literature exploring the theoretical implications of the feedback
e¤ect: see Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein (2012) for a survey. To our knowledge, we are the rst
to point out that feedback leads to an asymmetry between buying on good news and selling
on bad news. A key ingredient for our result is that the speculator is acting strategically, i.e.,
she takes into account her impact on the price and the rms decision. In reality, the most
informed speculators are likely to be large traders (such as hedge funds); indeed, it is their
ability to make large trades that incentivizes information acquisition. While strategic behavior
and price impact are common in the broader literature on nancial markets without feedback
(e.g. Kyle (1985)), they are missing from most papers analyzing the implications of feedback for
price informativeness. For example, the nancial market is modeled as a black boxin Bond,
Goldstein, and Prescott (2010) as the price simply equals expected value given fundamentals,
and there is no account of how speculators incorporate their information into the price via
trading. Dow, Goldstein, and Guembel (2010), Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan (2013), and
Bond and Goldstein (2014) feature a continuum of traders who e¤ectively act as price takers.
Another feedback paper that does feature a strategic trader is Goldstein and Guembel
(2008). Their paper analyzes how feedback provides an incentive for an uninformed speculator
to manipulate the stock price by short-selling the stock. This reduces the stock price and
induces incorrect disinvestment, thus generating a prot on the speculators short position.
Their model does not explore the potential asymmetry between trading on good versus bad
news.3 More recently, Boleslavsky, Kelly, and Taylor (2014) build on our analysis and develop
another model where feedback leads to asymmetric trading by a strategic investor. Their
paper demonstrates the broader applicability of the mechanism in our paper to the context of
policymakers learning from the price to guide a bailout or monetary stimulus, as well as its
3The Goldstein and Guembel (2008) framework would not be appropriate to explore this asymmetry, given
its other complexities. It needs to track the behavior of uninformed speculators, the core of the manipulation
story, and to deal with multiple rounds of trade, which are essential for the manipulation strategy to work.
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robustness to other modeling approaches. We discuss their paper further in Section 3.5.5.
Finally, the paper contributes to the large literature on limits to arbitrage4, which analyzes
why speculators do not trade fully on their information. We present a new source of limits to
arbitrage, which arises endogenously as part of the arbitrage process the feedback e¤ect. It
stems from the fact that the value of the asset being arbitraged is endogenous to the act of
exploiting the arbitrage. Campbell and Kyle (1993) focus on fundamental risk, i.e., the risk that
rm fundamentals will change while the arbitrage strategy is being pursued. In their model,
such changes are unrelated to speculatorsarbitrage activities. De Long, Shleifer, Summers,
and Waldmann (1990) study noise trader risk, i.e., the risk that noise trading will increase the
degree of mispricing. Noise trading only a¤ects the assets market price and not its fundamental
value, which is again exogenous to the act of arbitrage. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) show that,
even if an arbitrage strategy is sure to converge in the long-run, the possibility that mispricing
may widen in the short-run may deter speculators from pursuing it, if they are concerned
with short-run redemptions by their own investors. Similarly, Kondor (2009) demonstrates
that nancially-constrained arbitrageurs may stay out of a trade if they believe that it will
become more protable in the future. Many authors (e.g., Ponti¤ (1996), Mitchell and Pulvino
(2001), and Mitchell, Pulvino, and Sta¤ord (2002)) focus on the transaction and holding costs
that arbitrageurs incur while pursuing an arbitrage strategy. Others (Geczy, Musto, and Reed
(2002) and Lamont and Thaler (2003)) discuss the importance of short-sales constraints.
While many of these papers emphasize market frictions as the source of limits to arbitrage,
the limit to arbitrage we uncover arises precisely when the market performs its utmost e¢ cient
role: guiding the allocation of real resources. Thus, while limits to arbitrage based on market
frictions tend to attenuate with the development of nancial markets, the e¤ect identied by
this paper may strengthen: as investors become more sophisticated, managers will learn from
them to a greater degree. A natural limit to arbitrage featured in Kyle (1985) and the vast
subsequent literature is price impact trades move prices closer to fundamental value, and so
speculators reduce their trading volumes to lessen this impact. In contrast, the feedback e¤ect
constitutes a limit to arbitrage by moving the fundamental value closer to the price.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 contains the core
analysis, demonstrating the asymmetric limit to arbitrage. Section 4 investigates the extent
4Here, we use arbitrageto refer to investors trading on their private information. This notion of arbitrage
is broader than the traditional textbook notion of risk-free arbitrage when trading two identical securities.
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to which information a¤ects beliefs and prices. Section 5 concludes. Appendix A contains all
proofs not in the main text.
2 The Model
The model has three dates, t 2 f0; 1; 2g. There is a rm whose stock is traded in the nancial
market. The rms manager needs to take a decision on whether to keep the current level of
investment, increase it, or reduce it. The managers goal is to maximize expected rm value;
since there are no agency problems between the manager and the rm, we will use these two
terms interchangeably. At t = 0, a risk-neutral speculator may be present in the nancial
market. If present, she is informed about the state of nature  that determines both the
value of the rm under the current investment level, and also the protability of increasing or
decreasing investment. She rationally anticipates the e¤ect of her trading on the managers
investment level. Trading in the nancial market occurs at t = 1. In addition to the speculator,
two other agents participate in the nancial market: a noise trader whose trades are unrelated
to the realization of , and a risk-neutral market maker. The latter collects the orders from
the speculator and noise trader, and sets a price at which he executes the orders out of his
inventory. This price rationally anticipates the managers investment decision. At t = 2, the
manager takes the decision, which may be a¤ected by the trading in the nancial market at
t = 1. Finally, all uncertainty is resolved and payo¤s are realized. We now describe the rms
investment problem and the trading process in more detail.
2.1 The Firms Decision
At t = 2, the manager takes an investment decision denoted by d 2 f 1; 0; 1g, where d = 0
represents maintaining the current level of investment, d = 1 represents increasing investment
(which we will often simply refer to as investment), and d =  1 represents reducing invest-
ment (disinvestment). Changing the level of investment in either direction (i.e., choosing
d 2 f 1; 1g) costs the rm c  0. As we will discuss in Section 3.5, all of the models results
regarding the feedback e¤ect hold with c = 0. The case of c > 0 allows for the possibility of no
feedback e¤ect, thus enabling us to understand the role of the feedback e¤ect in our results.
The value of the rm, realized at t = 2, is denoted by v (; d). It depends on both the
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managers action d and the state of nature  2   fH;Lg (high and low), and is
summarized in Table 1. If the rm chooses d = 0, it is worth v (H; 0) = RH in state H and
v (L; 0) = RL < RH in state L. In state H, the correct action is to increase investment; doing so
creates additional value of x > 0 (gross of the cost c < x) and so v (H; 1) = RH+x c. Reducing
investment is the incorrect action and reduces rm value by x, and so v (H; 1) = RH   x  c.
Conversely, in state L, choosing d =  1 creates additional value of x, yielding a value of
v (L; 1) = RL+x c; choosing d = 1 costs the rm x, yielding a value of v (L; 1) = RL x c.
We deliberately set the value created by correct investment in stateH to equal the value created
by correct disinvestment in state L, and to be the negative of the value destroyed by an incorrect
investment decision, to avoid baking any asymmetries into the model. Instead, the asymmetric
limit to arbitrage will stem entirely from the feedback e¤ect.
Investment d
1 0  1
State  H RH + x  c RH RH   x  c
L RL   x  c RL RL + x  c
Table 1: Firm value
Note that the above specication implies that:
v (H; 1)  v (L; 1) > v (H; 0)  v (L; 0) > v (H; 1)  v (L; 1) : (1)
Inequality (1) is the driving force behind our results. It means that increasing (reducing)
investment increases (reduces) the dependence of rm value on the state. Thus, the speculators
private information on the state is less useful, the lower the investment level chosen by the
manager. In turn, inequality (1) incorporates two cases, depending on whether rm value is
monotonic in the underlying state:
Case 1: v (H; 1) > v (L; 1), i.e. RH   x > RL + x. In this case, state H entails higher
rm value, no matter what action has been taken by the rm. Hence, disinvestment attenuates,
but does not eliminate, the e¤ect of the state on rm value. For example, state H (L) can
represent high (low) demand for the rms products. Whether the rm increases or reduces its
level of production, its value will be lower in state L, but the negative e¤ect of low demand is
attenuated if the rm operates at a lower scale. Note that RH   x > RL + x is equivalent to
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RH   RL > 2x, i.e. the speculators private information over assets in place is relatively more
important than the managers investment decision, and thus the feedback e¤ect.5
Case 2: v (H; 1) < v (L; 1), i.e. RH   x < RL + x. In this case, if disinvestment occurs,
rm value is higher in state L. The investment decision is su¢ ciently powerful to overturn
the e¤ect of the state on rm value. Firm value is non-monotonic in the state: one state does
not dominate the other. For example, consider the case where d = 1 implies proceeding with a
takeover decision, d =  1 implies selling assets for cash, and d = 0 implies doing nothing. State
H corresponds to a state in which current acquisition opportunities dominate future ones, and
state L refers to the reverse. If the rm does nothing or makes an acquisition, its value is higher
in state H. In contrast, if the rm sells assets to raise cash, its value is higher in state L since it
can use the cash raised to exploit future acquisition opportunities. Another example is related
to Aghion and Stein (2008): d = 1 corresponds to a growth strategy, and d =  1 corresponds
to a strategy focused on current prot margins. Growth prospects are good if  = H and bad if
 = L. If the rm eschews the growth strategy (d =  1), its value is higher in the low state in
which there are no growth opportunities. In contrast, in the high state its rivals could pursue
the growth opportunities, in turn worsening its competitive position.
Case 1, where a high state dominates a low state, is the common assumption in the
literature (including the prior limits-to-arbitrage literature where rm value is exogenous) and
will be the focus of our analyses. Section 3.4 will briey discuss Case 2 and explain how the
fundamental intuition for our asymmetric limit to arbitrage becomes even stronger; the full
analysis is in Appendix B.1.
The prior probability that the state is  = H is y = 1
2
, which is common knowledge. The
manager uses information from trades in the nancial market to update his prior to form a
posterior q, which then guides his investment decision. Let 1 denote the posterior belief that
the state is H such that the manager is indi¤erent between investing and doing nothing, i.e.:
1RH + (1  1)RL = 1 (RH + x) + (1  1) (RL   x)  c; (2)
5The importance of the feedback e¤ect is given by the gross gain in rm value from correct (dis)investment
x, rather than the net gain x  c. It is true that inducing the manager to take the correct action increases rm
value by x  c. However, the feedback e¤ect can also deter the manager from taking the incorrect action, which
would lead to rm value changing by  x  c. Thus, the gain in rm value from avoiding the incorrect decision
is x+ c, and so the cost c nets out.
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which yields
1 =
1
2
+
c
2x
:
Similarly, let  1 be the posterior belief on state H such that the manager is indi¤erent between
disinvesting and doing nothing, i.e.:
 1RH + (1   1)RL =  1 (RH   x) + (1   1) (RL + x)  c;
which yields
 1 =
1
2
  c
2x
:
For completeness and without loss of generality, if the manager is indi¤erent between doing
nothing and changing the investment level, we will assume that he will maintain the status quo.
The values of 1 and  1 < 1 represent cuto¤sthat determine the managers action. If and
only if q > 1, he will increase investment; if and only if q <  1, he will reduce investment.
For  1  q  1, he will maintain the current investment level.
Since y = 1
2
, the ex-ante net rm value created by changing investment in either direction is
1
2
(x  c) + 1
2
( x  c) =  c  0, and so the ex-ante optimal decision is to do nothing. As long
as the information in the market does not change the managers prior much ( 1  q  1),
he will maintain the current investment level. As we can see from the denitions of  1 and
1, the range of posteriors for which the rm remains with the status quo is increasing in the
adjustment cost c and decreasing in the value created from optimizing investment x.
2.2 Trade in the Financial Market
At t = 0, a speculator arrives in the nancial market with probability , where 0 <  < 1.
Whether she is present is unknown to anyone else.6 If present, she observes the state of nature 
with certainty. We will use the term positively- (negatively-) informed speculatorto describe
a speculator who observes  = H ( = L). The variable  is a measure of market sophistication
or the informedness of outside investors, and will generate a number of comparative statics.
The speculator has no initial position in the rm. Section 3.5 will discuss how the key intuition
and results continue to hold under a positive initial stake; the full analysis is in Appendix B.2.
6Since private information is not public knowledge, its existence is also unlikely to be public knowledge.
Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2004) also feature uncertainty on whether the speculator is present, in an equilibrium
in which informed insiders manipulate the market by trading in the wrong direction.
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Trading in the nancial market happens at t = 1. Always present is a noise trader, who
trades z 2 f 1; 0; 1g with equal probability. If the speculator is present, she makes an endoge-
nous trading choice s 2 f 1; 0; 1g. Trading either  1 or 1 costs the speculator . The trading
cost  should be interpreted broadly. While direct transaction costs from commissions are typi-
cally small, other indirect costs can be large. These include borrowing costs (for short sales) and
the opportunity costs of capital commitment (for purchases). These costs may di¤er between
buying and selling, but the relative size is a priori unclear. Given our interest in exploring the
endogenous asymmetry between buying and selling due to the feedback e¤ect, we assume the
same trading cost  in both directions to avoid generating any asymmetry mechanically. Unless
otherwise specied, we refer to trading prots and losses gross of the cost . If the speculator
is indi¤erent between trading and not trading, we assume that she will not trade.
Following Kyle (1985), market orders are submitted simultaneously to a competitive market
maker who absorbs orders out of his inventory and sets the price equal to expected asset value,
given the information contained in the order ow. The market maker can only observe total
order ow X = s + z, but not its individual components s and z. Possible order ows are
X 2 f 2; 1; 0; 1; 2g and the pricing function is p (X) = E(vjX). A critical departure from
Kyle (1985) is that rm value here is endogenous, because it depends on the managers action
which is in turn based on information revealed by trading.
Specically, the manager observes total order ow X and uses it to form his posterior q,
which then guides his investment decision. Allowing the manager to observe order ow X,
rather than just the price p, simplies the analysis without a¤ecting its economic content. In
the equilibria that we analyze, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the price and the
order ow in most cases; in the few cases where two order ows correspond to the same price,
the managers decision is the same for both order ows. Under the alternative assumption that
the manager observes p, other equilibria can arise, in which the market maker sets a price that is
consistent with a di¤erent managerial decision (one that is suboptimal given the information in
the order ow) and this becomes self-fullling due to the dependence of the managers decision
on the price. Since our interest is in the feedback e¤ect, we focus on equilibria where the
managers decision responds optimally to the information in the order ow.7
7Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that managers have access to information about trading quantities.
First, market making is competitive and so there is little secrecy in the order ow; second, microstructure
databases (such as TAQ) provide such information at a short lag rapidly enough to guide investment decisions.
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As is standard in the feedback literature, we assume that the speculator cannot credibly
communicate her information directly to the manager, since it is non-veriable. Instead, she
uses her information to maximize her trading prots (as in the theories of governance through
trading/exit by Admati and Peiderer (2009), Edmans (2009), and Edmans and Manso
(2011)). The trade-o¤ between using private information to trade or intervene has been studied
by Maug (1998) and Kahn and Winton (1998).
2.3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept we use is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Here, it is dened as follows:
(i) A trading strategy by the speculator: S :  ! f 1; 0; 1g that maximizes her expected
nal payo¤ s(v   p)   jsj, given the price setting rule, the strategy of the manager, and
her information about the realization of . (ii) An investment strategy by the manager D :
Q ! f 1; 0; 1g (where Q = f 2; 1; 0; 1; 2g), that maximizes expected rm value v given
the information in the order ow and all other strategies. (iii) A price setting strategy by the
market maker p : Q ! R that allows him to break even in expectation, given the information in
the order ow and all other strategies. Moreover, (iv) the rm and the market maker use Bayes
rule to update their beliefs from the orders they observe in the nancial market, and (v) beliefs
on outcomes not observed on the equilibrium path satisfy the Cho and Kreps (1987) Intuitive
Criterion. Finally, (vi) all agents have rational expectations in that each players belief about
the other playersstrategies is correct in equilibrium.
3 Feedback E¤ect and Asymmetric Trading
In this section, we characterize the pure-strategy equilibria in our model and demonstrate
the asymmetric limits to arbitrage that result from the feedback e¤ect. We focus on Case 1
(RH   x > RL + x), where rm value is monotonic in the state. Case 2 is briey discussed in
Section 3.4 and fully analyzed in Appendix B.1.
3.1 Overview of equilibria when rm value is monotonic in states
The equilibrium will depend on whether order ow is su¢ ciently informative to overturn the
ex-ante optimal decision of d = 0. Hence, we distinguish between two cases. In the rst
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(feedback) case, 1
2  > 1. As we will show,
1
2  represents the posterior probability of state
H under an order ow of X = 1 in some equilibria. When 1
2  > 1, the probability  that the
speculator is present is high enough thatX = 1 is su¢ ciently informative to induce the manager
to invest. Thus, there is feedback from the market to real decisions. Since  1+1 = 1, 12  > 1
is equivalent to 1 
2  <  1. In some equilibria,
1 
2  represents the posterior probability of state
H under an order ow of X =  1. When 1 
2  <  1, the posterior is su¢ ciently low to induce
the manager to disinvest. In the second (no feedback) case, 1
2   1 and 1 2    1. Here,
there is no feedback e¤ect for these posteriors: the order ow is not su¢ ciently informative to
change the managers decision from the status quo.
As we will show, depending on the values of , four equilibrium outcomes can arise:
1. No Trade Equilibrium NT : the speculator does not trade,
2. Trade Equilibrium T : the speculator buys when she knows that  = H and sells when
she knows that  = L,
3. Partial Trade Equilibrium BNS (Buy Not Sell): the speculator buys when she knows
that  = H and does not trade when she knows that  = L,
4. Partial Trade Equilibrium SNB (Sell Not Buy): the speculator does not trade when
she knows that  = H and sells when she knows that  = L.
3.2 No feedback equilibria
Lemma 1 provides the characterization of equilibrium outcomes in the case of no feedback.
Lemma 1 (Equilibrium, rm value is monotone in the state, no feedback). Suppose that RH 
x > RL+x and 12   1 (, 1 2    1). There exist cuto¤s NF < NT (dened in the proof)
such that the trading game has the following pure-strategy equilibria:
(a) When  < NF , the only pure-strategy equilibrium is T .
(b) When   NT , the only pure-strategy equilibrium is NT .
(c) When NF   < NT , the two pure strategy equilibria are BNS and SNB.
There is no range of parameter values for which the BNS equilibrium exists and the SNB
equilibrium does not exist, or vice versa.
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Proof. This proof is incorporated in the proof of Proposition 1.
Two sources of limits to arbitrage are present in the no-feedback case, both of which are
standard in the literature, and both of which are symmetric. The rst source is the trading
cost . As  increases, we move to equilibria in which speculators trade less on their private
information. NT is the threshold for no trading: when   NT there is no trading in either
direction. Unsurprisingly, greater transaction costs deter speculators from trading. At the other
extreme, when the trading cost is su¢ ciently low ( < NF , where the subscript indexes the
no feedbackregime), the speculator always trades on her private information.
The second source of limits to arbitrage is the price impact that speculators exert when
they trade on their information: Knowing that trading might move the price against them,
speculators might refrain from trading. In our model, price impact leads to partial trade
equilibria in the intermediate region NF   < NT . In these equilibria, the speculator trades
on one type of information but not the other. While these equilibria are asymmetric  the
speculator either buys on good news and does not trade on bad news, or she sells on bad
news and does not trade on good news there is symmetry in that both types of asymmetric
equilibria, BNS and SNB, are possible in exactly the same range of parameters.
To understand the intuition behind this pair of asymmetric equilibria, consider the BNS
equilibrium (the SNB equilibrium is analogous). In this equilibrium, the market maker believes
that the speculator buys on good news and does not trade on bad news. Given that the
market maker believes that the speculator buys on good news, a negative order ow is very
revealing that the speculator is negatively informed and the price moves sharply to reect this.
Specically, X =  1 is inconsistent with the speculator having positive information (as she
would have bought), and so the price is only 1 
2 RH+
1
2 RL. Thus, the speculator makes little
prot from selling on bad news; knowing this, she chooses not to trade on bad news. Conversely,
given that the market maker believes that the speculator does not sell on bad news, a positive
order ow of X = 1 is consistent with the speculator being negatively informed and choosing
not to trade. As a result, the market maker sets a relatively low price of 1
2
RH +
1
2
RL, which
allows the speculator to make high prots by buying. Thus, the equilibrium is sustainable.
These partial trade equilibria are an interesting feature of our no-feedback case. To our
knowledge, they have not been previously discussed in the literature. However, they are driven
by the well-known economic force of price impact. In many theories, price impact causes spec-
ulators to scale down their trading, and this is manifested in di¤erent ways in di¤erent models.
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In our model, price impact is manifested in asymmetric partial trade equilibria: The order
ow in the direction in which the speculator does not trade becomes particularly informative,
leading to a larger price impact which reduces the potential trading prots. Importantly, in
the absence of feedback, this force is symmetric: There is no value of  in which one partial
trade equilibrium exists but the other does not. The same force that deters the speculator from
selling in the BNS equilibrium also deters her from buying in the SNB equilibrium, and the
two forces are equally strong. Thus, the two equilibria are possible in exactly the same range
of parameter values, and there is no range of parameter values for which either equilibrium is
unique. In addition, there is no obvious way to select between these two equilibria. Under both
BNS and SNB, expected rm value is 1
2
(RH +RL) +
1
6
(x  c) and the speculators expected
trading prot is 1
6
(RH RL)  12 (implying the same losses for noise traders). Hence, we cannot
rank these equilibria based on the Pareto criterion.
3.3 Feedback equilibria
3.3.1 Characterization of equilibrium outcomes
Proposition 1 provides the characterization of equilibrium outcomes in the case of feedback.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium, rm value is monotone in the state, feedback). Suppose that
RH x > RL+x and 12  > 1 (, 1 2  <  1). There exist cuto¤s SNB, NT , and T (dened
in the proof), where T < SNB and T < NT , such that the trading game has the following
pure-strategy equilibria:
(a) When  < T , the only pure-strategy equilibrium is T .
(b) When   NT , the only pure-strategy equilibrium is NT .
(c) When T   < NT , BNS is an equilibrium.
(d) If SNB < NT , SNB is also an equilibrium in the range SNB   < NT .
There is a strictly positive range of parameter values (T   < min (SNB; NT )) for which
BNS is the only pure-strategy equilibrium. There is no range of parameter values for which
the SNB equilibrium exists but the BNS equilibrium does not exist. Equilibrium results are
depicted in Figure 1, which also contrasts them with the equilibrium results in the case of no
feedback.
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Proof. (This proof also incorporates the proof of Lemma 1 for ease of comparison. More
details behind the calculations below are in Appendix A.) Since rm value is always higher
when  = H than when  = L, it is straightforward to show that the speculator will never
buy when she knows that  = L and never sell when she knows that  = H. Then, the
only possible pure-strategy equilibria are NT , T , BNS, and SNB. Below, we identify the
conditions under which each of these equilibria holds. If an order ow of X =  2 (X = 2)
is observed o¤ the equilibrium path, we assume that the market maker and manager believe
that the speculator knows that the state is L (H). Since speculators always lose if they trade
against their information, this is the only belief that is consistent with the Intuitive Criterion.
No Trade Equilibrium NT :
For a given order ow X, the posterior q, the managers decision d and the price p are given
by the following table (see Appendix A for the full calculations):
X  2  1 0 1 2
q 0 1
2
1
2
1
2
1
d  1 0 0 0 1
p RL + x  c 12RH + 12RL 12RH + 12RL 12RH + 12RL RH + x  c
As shown in Appendix A, the gain to the negatively-informed speculator (gross of the
transaction cost ) from deviating to selling is NT  13 (RH  RL), and this is also the gain
to the positively-informed speculator from deviating to buying. Thus, this equilibrium holds if
and only if   NT .
Partial Trade Equilibrium BNS:
For a given order ow X, the posterior q, the managers decision d and the price p are given
by the following table:
X  2  1 0
q 0 1 
2 
1
2
d  1
8<:  1 if 1 2  <  10 if 1 
2    1
0
p RL + x  c
8<: 1 2  (RH   x) + 12  (RL + x)  c if 1 2  <  11 
2 RH +
1
2 RL if
1 
2    1
1
2
RH +
1
2
RL
17
X 1 2
q 1
2
1
d 0 1
p 1
2
RH +
1
2
RL RH + x  c
Calculating the gain to the negatively-informed speculator from deviating to selling and to
the positively-informed speculator from deviating to not trading, we can see that this equi-
librium holds if and only if 1
3

1 
2  (RH  RL   2x) + 12 (RH  RL)
  T   < NT 
1
3
(RH  RL) for the case of feedback and if and only if 13

(1 
2  +
1
2
) (RH  RL)
  NF   <
NT  13(RH  RL) for the case of no feedback.
Partial Trade Equilibrium SNB:
For a given order ow X, the posterior q, the managers decision d and the price p are given
by the following table:
X  2  1 0
q 0 1
2
1
2
d  1 0 0
p RL + x  c 12RH + 12RL 12RH + 12RL
X 1 2
q 1
2  1
d
8<: 0 if 12   11 if 1
2  > 1
1
p
8<: 12 RH + 1 2 RL if 12   11
2  (RH + x) +
1 
2  (RL   x)  c if 12  > 1
RH + x  c
Calculating the gain to the negatively-informed speculator from deviating to not trading and
to the positively-informed speculator from deviating to buying, we can see that this equilibrium
holds if and only if 1
3

1 
2  (RH  RL + 2x) + 12 (RH  RL)
  SNB   < NT for the case of
feedback and if and only if NF   < NT for the case of no feedback.
Trade Equilibrium T :
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For a given order ow X, the posterior q, the managers decision d and the price p are given
by the following table:
X  2  1 0
q 0 1 
2 
1
2
d  1
8<:  1 if 1 2  <  10 if 1 
2    1
0
p RL + x  c
8<: 1 2  (RH   x) + 12  (RL + x)  c if 1 2    11 
2 RH +
1
2 RL if
1 
2  >  1
1
2
RH +
1
2
RL
X 1 2
q 1
2  1
d
8<: 0 if 12   11 if 1
2  > 1
1
p
8<: 12 RH + 1 2 RL if 12   11
2  (RH + x) +
1 
2  (RL   x)  c if 12  > 1
RH + x  c
Calculating the gain to both the positively-informed and negatively-informed speculator
from deviating to not trading, we can see that this equilibrium holds if and only if  < T for
the case of feedback and if and only if  < NF for the case of no feedback.
3.3.2 Discussion of equilibria and comparison with the case of no feedback
Figure 1 demonstrates the contrast in possible equilibrium outcomes between the feedback
case of Lemma 1 and the no-feedback case of Proposition 1. There are two di¤erences. First,
consider the range T   < NF . In this range, the unique equilibrium without feedback is the
T equilibrium where the speculator buys on good news and sells on bad news. With feedback,
the unique equilibrium is instead the Partial Trade Equilibrium BNS, where the speculator
buys on good news, but does not trade on bad news. Hence, for T   < NF , the feedback
e¤ect generates a limit to arbitrage whereby the speculator no longer trades on bad news.
Second, consider the range NF   < min(SNB; NT ). In this range, no-feedback case yields
two Partial Trade Equilibria BNS and SNB, which cannot be distinguished by any standard
criterion. With feedback, SNB is no longer an equilibrium, and the unique equilibrium is
BNS. Hence, for NF   < min(SNB; NT ), the feedback e¤ect leads to asymmetric trading
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Feedback
No Feedback
* Region disappears if κSNB ≥ κNT
BNS is the unique equilibrium with feedback but
does not exist without feedback.
BNS and SNB
T
T
NT
NT
BNS
SNB*
κT κNF κSNB κNT
κ
BNS is the unique equilibrium with feedback but
co-exists with SNB without feedback.
Figure 1: Parameter ranges for equilibria with and without feedback
in which buying is more common than selling (instead of both Partial Trade Equilibria holding
for the same range of ).
Overall, combining the two above parameter ranges, we see that feedback expands the range
of parameters that supports the BNS equilibrium and contracts the range that supports the
SNB equilibrium. In one range, BNS replaces T as the unique equilibrium; in the other range
SNB disappears, leaving BNS as the unique equilibrium. Combining these two regions, there
is a strictly positive range of parameters (T   < min (SNB; NT )) for which BNS is the
only pure-strategy equilibrium under feedback, as stated in Proposition 1. In contrast, there
is no range of parameter values for which SNB exists but BNS does not. This is unlike the
no-feedback case, where the BNS equilibrium is never unique and always coexists with the
SNB equilibrium.
We now explain the intuition for why feedback makes the BNS equilibrium more prevalent
and the SNB equilibrium less so. We start withBNS. Consider the realization of state L. If the
negatively-informed speculator deviates to selling and the noise trader does not trade, we have
X =  1, which provides su¢ cient negative information to induce the manager to disinvest in
the case of feedback, but not in the case of no feedback. Disinvestment is the optimal decision in
state L and improves rm value, reducing the prot of a selling speculator in the node ofX =  1
from 1 
2  (RH  RL) (under no feedback) to 1 2  (RH  RL   2x). Hence, while a transaction
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cost of   NF is necessary and su¢ cient to deter the negatively-informed speculator from
selling under no feedback, a transaction cost of only   T (< NF ) is necessary and su¢ cient
to deter selling under feedback, and so the BNS equilibrium is easier to sustain. The di¤erence
between NF and T is 13
1 
2 2x, the probability of X =  1 (13) multiplied by the decrease in
trading prots in this node under feedback (1 
2 2x). Due to feedback, the T equilibrium is
replaced by the BNS equilibrium for T   < NF . The feedback e¤ect thus provides an
endogenous limit to arbitrage distinct from those identied in prior literature  arbitrage is
limited because the value of the asset being arbitraged is endogenous to the act of arbitrage.
As shown in Appendix A, the transaction cost required to deter selling in the BNS equi-
librium is T  13

1 
2  (RH  RL   2x) + 12 (RH  RL)

. As is intuitive, a smaller transaction
cost is needed if the feedback e¤ect on rm value x is important relative to the speculators
private information RH   RL. The required transaction cost is also lower if the probability of
private information  is high, as then the speculators price impact is greater. Note that the
transaction cost required to deter informed selling is strictly positive in Case 1, as the feedback
e¤ect reduces but does not eliminate the prots from informed selling. As discussed in Section
3.4, in Case 2 the feedback e¤ect can be su¢ ciently strong to rule out informed selling even
without a transaction cost. Finally, one may wonder if it is is reasonable to expect  to be as
large as T so as to deter selling in the BNS equilibrium in Case 1. Recall that our leading
interpretation of  is that it captures the opportunity cost of trading other assets. If these other
opportunities have similar information asymmetry (parameterized by RH  RL) to the rm in
question, then the expected prot from the alternative trading opportunity (in the absence of
feedback) is 1
3

1 
2  (RH  RL) + 12 (RH  RL)

, which is higher than T .
We now move to the SNB equilibrium. Consider the realization of state H. The critical
order ow is now X = 1, which provides enough positive information to induce the manager
to invest under feedback. Investment is the optimal decision in state H and improves rm
value, increasing the prot of a buying speculator in the node of X = 1 from 1 
2  (RH  RL)
(under no feedback) to 1 
2  (RH  RL + 2x), and so the SNB equilibrium is harder to sustain.
While a transaction cost of   NF is necessary and su¢ cient to deter the positively-informed
speculator from buying under no feedback, a higher transaction cost of   SNB (> NF )
is necessary and su¢ cient to deter buying under feedback. The di¤erence between NF and
SNB is 13
1 
2 2x, the probability of X = 1 (
1
3
) multiplied by increase in trading prots in this
node under feedback (1 
2 2x). Moreover, if x >

4(1 ) (RH  RL), then SNB  NT and the
21
SNB equilibrium is never sustainable with feedback. The rst inequality is satised if x is
large, so that the feedback e¤ect creates signicant value and thus markedly reduces (increases)
the protability of selling (buying). Even if SNB < NT , there is still a nonempty region
T   < SNB, where BNS is sustainable even when SNB is not. The width of this range is
SNB   T = 43 1 2 x and thus is increasing in x, the strength of the feedback e¤ect.
In sum, due to the feedback e¤ect, trading on information in either direction buying on
positive information or selling on negative information puts information into prices, improv-
ing the managers investment decision. This increases rm value, raising the protability of
informed buying relative to informed selling, and thus leads to asymmetric trading.
There is an important nuance in why the feedback e¤ect reduces trading prots. Intuition
may suggest that the market makers pricing function will undo the feedback e¤ect: since
he is rational, the price he sets for a given order ow takes into account the order ows e¤ect
on the managers decision. Thus, the price received by the speculator will always reect the
managers action d, and so it seems that the action should not a¤ect her prots. Such intuition
turns out to be incorrect. The source of the speculators prots is not superior knowledge of the
managers action d, since the market maker can indeed perfectly predict this action from the
order ow. The speculators superior knowledge concerns the state she directly observes ,
but the market maker can only imperfectly infer it from the order ow. In turn, the managers
action d (and thus the feedback e¤ect on the managers action) a¤ects trading prots because
it a¤ects how important the state is for rm value. From (1), rm value is more sensitive to
the state and thus the speculator makes greater prots from her information on the state 
the greater the level of investment. Hence, buying and causing the manager to invest increases
the protability of buying, whereas selling and causing the manager to disinvest reduces the
protability of selling.
3.3.3 Implications for real e¢ ciency
We now discuss the implications of asymmetric trading for real e¢ ciency. The feedback ef-
fect increases real e¢ ciency by providing the manager information to improve his investment
decision. However, the limit to arbitrage induced by the feedback e¤ect deters the speculator
from trading on her information, reducing price informativeness and thus the net gains from
the feedback e¤ect. Suppose the trading cost  changes from T   " to T + " for an arbitrarily
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small positive ". The equilibrium, in the case of feedback, will switch from T to BNS, which
reduces the e¢ ciency of the investment decision and thus rm value. Simple calculations show
that rm value is higher in the T equilibrium by 1
3
(x  c), which reects that correct decisions
occur more frequently under T due to informed selling by the speculator.8
Note that rm values in both equilibria remain higher than if the manager never learns from
the market (e.g. because there is no informed speculator, or the manager ignores the information
in prices).9 Hence, the feedback e¤ect directly adds value by informing the managers decision.
However, the feedback e¤ect also indirectly reduces rm value by inducing the limit to arbitrage
identied by this paper. This reduces the speculators incentive to trade on bad news, lowering
but not eliminating the extent to which the market informs the managers decision. The
overall e¤ect of learning from the market on rm value remains positive.
3.4 Equilibria when rm value is non-monotonic in states
For completeness, we discuss the nature of the equilibria that arise when rm value is non-
monotonic in the state, and outline the underlying intuition (the full analysis is in Appendix
B.1). Under Case 2 (RH   x < RL + x), disinvestment not only mitigates the e¤ect of the low
state but is su¢ ciently powerful to overturn it, so that rm value is higher in the low state than
in the high state. As a result, the asymmetric trading result becomes stronger. Now, if the
speculator sells on negative information and we have X =  1 so that the manager disinvests,
the speculator can su¤er a loss (rather than just a smaller prot) even before transaction costs.
As in Case 1, both the speculator and market maker will know that disinvestment will occur if
X =  1, but have di¤ering views on rm value conditional on disinvestment. The speculator
knows that disinvestment will occur and that  = L. Unlike in Case 1, here rm value is highest
under disinvestment when  = L. Thus, the speculators knowledge that  = L leads her to
assign the highest possible value to a disinvesting rm (v = RL + x   c). As in Case 1, the
market maker does not know that  = L and prices the rm taking into account the possibility
that  = H. Unlike in Case 1, rm value is lower when  = H, and so the price set by the
8The calculation of rm value in both equilibria is as follows. With probability 12 ,  = H. In the T
equilibrium, the manager invests unless X = 0, and so v (H) = RH + 23 (x   c); in the BNS equilibrium, the
manager only invests when X = 2; so v (H) = RH + 13 (x  c). With probability 12 ,  = L. In the T equilibrium,
X 2 f 2; 1; 0g and so the manager correctly disinvests unless X = 0, so v (L) = RL + 23 (x  c). In the BNS
equilibrium, X 2 f 1; 0; 1g and the manager correctly disinvests only if X =  1. Thus, v(L) = RL+ 13 (x  c).
Regardless of whether  = fH;Lg, rm value is higher in the T equilibrium by 13 (x  c).
9In this case, v (H) = RH and v (L) = RL.
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market maker (1 
2  (RH   x) + 12  (RL + x)  c) is less than the true value of the rm. Thus,
the speculators prot (before transaction costs) is negative (1 
2  (RH  RL   2x)). This result
contrasts standard informed trading models where a speculator can never make a loss (before
transactions costs) if she trades in the direction of her information. The key to this loss is the
feedback e¤ect. As a result, the minimum transaction cost required to deter informed selling
in the BNS equilibrium, T  13

1 
2  (RH  RL   2x) + 12 (RH  RL)

, is lower in Case 2 as
the rst term is now negative. Indeed, T may be negative overall, in which case a negatively-
informed speculator will not sell even if transactions costs are zero.
The non-monotonicity in Case 2 also introduces a new force: when the feedback e¤ect is
su¢ ciently strong, the positively-informed speculator may wish to manipulate the price by
deviating (from her equilibrium action of buying in BNS or T , or no trade in SNB or NT ) to
selling.10 If she sells when  = H, she potentially misleads the manager to believe that  = L
and disinvest. Since disinvestment is suboptimal when  = H, this decision reduces rm value
and so the speculator may prot from her short position. Hence, for each of the four equilibria,
an additional condition must be satised to rule out manipulation. A su¢ cient condition to
prevent manipulation in all four equilibria is RH   RL > 43x: the loss from trading against
good news (which is proportional to RH   RL) is su¢ ciently high relative to the benet from
manipulation (which is proportional to x). The same issue does not arise with the negatively-
informed speculator, as she never has an incentive to deviate to buying. If she does so, she
misleads the manager to believe that  = H and incorrectly invest. This decision reduces rm
value, causing the speculator to incur a loss on her long position.11
3.5 Discussion of Model Assumptions and Applicability
The above analysis has shown that the feedback e¤ect discourages informed selling relative to
informed buying. This section discusses which features of our setting are necessary for this
result and which can be relaxed, thus highlighting the conditions under which asymmetric
trading due to the feedback e¤ect likely exists in the real world.
10The positively-informed speculator will never sell in equilibrium because, if the market maker and manager
believe that she is manipulating the price, she cannot prot from doing so, and so the set of pure-strategy
equilibria remains unchanged at NT , T , SNB, and BNS. However, stronger conditions are required to ensure
that she is not tempted to deviate to selling in the above equilibria.
11This analysis is related to Goldstein and Guembel (2008), who analyze the possibility of manipulative
trading in the presence of feedback e¤ects.
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3.5.1 Condition for the feedback e¤ect to exist
Our main result about the larger range of parameters where the BNS equilibrium holds, and
the smaller range of parameters where the SNB equilibrium holds, requires feedback from
the nancial market to real decisions. This in turn arises if nancial market trading conveys
su¢ cient information to inuence the managers decision. Specically, the asymmetry between
the BNS and SNB equilibria in Proposition 1 requires 1
2  > 1 =
1
2
+ c
2x
() 1 
2  <  1 =
1
2
  c
2x
. These inequalities are more likely to be satised if x is large relative to c the value
created by improving the managers investment decision is high relative to the cost of doing so
because then the feedback e¤ect is more important. Note that the asymmetry holds most
clearly when c = 0, as then the feedback e¤ect always exists. The role of c > 0 is to give rise
to cases in which the feedback e¤ect is absent, allowing us to compare the equilibria in the
feedback and no-feedback cases, and thus highlight the role of the feedback e¤ect in generating
asymmetric trading.
They are also more likely to be satised if , the probability that the speculator is present,
is high, so that the order ow is su¢ ciently informative to change managerial decisions. The
extent to which the manager will change his decision in response to trading will also depend on
additional factors outside the model. If the investment is di¢ cult to reverse (e.g., an M&A deal
in which there is a formal merger agreement or a termination fee, or an irreversible physical
investment), or the manager is less likely to reverse it due to agency problems (e.g., weak
governance allows him to pursue negative-NPV investment to maximize his private benets),
the feedback e¤ect will be weaker and so the result on reduced selling relative to buying may
not arise.
Hewlett Packards (HP) acquisition of Compaq illustrates a circumstance under which the
feedback e¤ect arises. HPs stock price fell 19% upon announcement on September 4, 2001.
That HPs CEO conveyed the unanimous support of its high-prole board for the deal con-
tributed to the magnitude of the decline, as traders did not fear that their selling would lead
to deal cancellation. To everyones surprise, Walter Hewlett, who earlier voted in favor of the
deal as a board member, announced opposition on behalf of the Hewlett Foundation in the
wake of the stock price drop. As chairman of the second-largest shareholder and the son of the
companys founder, he posed a credible threat to the deal. Shares of HP rose 17% in response,
suggesting that the speculators would not have sold so aggressively had they known that the
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negative price impact could trigger a corrective action. The combination of rational investor
expectation at the time of deal announcement and the expectation being ex post incorrect
(due to the unexpected behavior of Walter Hewlett) o¤ers a unique opportunity to observe the
feedback e¤ect.
3.5.2 Uncertainty regarding the presence of a speculator ( < 1)
Another important assumption in our model is  < 1, so that there is uncertainty on whether
there is an informed speculator in the market. To see this, note that the feedback e¤ect only
a¤ects prots for the nodes of X = f 1; 1g. If X = f 2; 2g, the speculator is fully revealed and
makes zero trading prots; if X = 0, there is no feedback e¤ect as the price is uninformative.
Thus, the prots from informed buying equal the prots from informed selling, and again there
is no asymmetry. In turn,  < 1 is necessary for the speculator not to be fully revealed when
X = f 1; 1g and thus for trading prots to be non-zero. For example, consider the market
makers inference from seeing X =  1 in the BNS equilibrium. This order ow is consistent
with either the speculator being absent (in which case the state may be H or L), or present
and negatively informed. If  = 1, the rst case is ruled out, and so the market maker knows
for certain that  = L. Thus, X =  1 is fully revealing: the market maker knows both that
disinvestment will occur, and that the state is L, and so sets the price exactly equal to the
fundamental value of RL + x   c. The speculators prots are zero, and thus automatically
una¤ected by the managers decision and the feedback e¤ect. Indeed, if  = 1, then T = SNB
and there is no range of parameter values in which there is a BNS equilibrium but no SNB
equilibrium.
In contrast, if  < 1, the market maker predicts the managers action but does not know
the state. Since X =  1 can be consistent with the speculator being absent and the state being
H, the market maker allows for the possibility that  = H and sets a price of 1 
2 v (H; d) +
1
2 v (L; d). Because the speculator knows the state in addition to the action, she makes a prot
of 1 
2  (v (H; d)  v (L; d)).
The core interpretation of the parameter  is the probability that an informed speculator is
present in the market. Another interpretation is that the speculator is always present, but can
only trade with probability . For example, with probability 1  she receives a liquidity shock
that prevents her from trading: buying a share requires capital, and shorting a share requires
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posting margin. A third framework is that the speculator is always present and can trade, but
is informed only with probability . This alternative scenario, however, requires us to consider
the possibility that the uninformed speculator will choose to sell to manipulate the price, as in
Goldstein and Guembel (2008), because doing so may dupe the manager into disinvesting. Since
d = 0 is optimal in the absence of information, such manipulation will enable the speculator to
prot on a short position. To keep the paper focused on its primary contribution, we do not
analyze this framework here.
3.5.3 Zero initial position
The core model assumes that the speculator has a zero initial stake in the rm. Appendix
B.2 fully analyzes the case in which the speculator owns an initial stake of  > 0 (i.e. is
a blockholder) and shows that the key results continue to hold. The fundamental force of
the model  the feedback e¤ect increases the protability of buying on positive information
relative to selling on negative information is independent of the speculators initial stake. It
remains the case that there is a strictly positive range of transaction costs for which the BNS
equilibrium exists and the SNB equilibrium does not, and that there is no range for which the
SNB equilibrium exists but the BNS equilibrium does not. Moreover, the width of the range
of transaction costs for which BNS exists and SNB does not (SNB   T in the core model)
is 1
3
1 
2 4x and independent of the initial stake .
The intuition for the irrelevance of the initial stake is as follows. A positive initial stake
increases a negatively-informed speculators incentive to sell, because if selling leads to (cor-
rect) disinvestment, it increases the value of the speculators initial stake. However, it also
increases the positively-informed speculators incentive to buy, because if buying leads to (cor-
rect) investment, it increases the value of the speculators initial stake by the same margin.
Specically, if a negatively-informed speculator trades  1, she ends up with a nal position of
  1. If a positively-informed speculator trades +1, she ends up with + 1. The incentive to
trade on information to increase the value of her initial stake  (through the feedback e¤ect)
is symmetric across buying and selling, and so cancels out. We are thus left with the di¤erence
between trading  1 on negative information and trading +1 on positive information, which is
the same as in the core model with  = 0. Hence, the asymmetry between buying on good
news and selling on bad news remains despite the fact that both trading directions become
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more attractive when the speculator has an initial position.
3.5.4 Corrective action
In our model, the real decision is a corrective action in that it improves rm value in the
low state. This case arises when the decision maker maximizes rm value. While we model
a manager who attempts to maximize rm value via an investment decision, other potential
applications include a board of directors ring an underperforming manager in the bad state
or an outside investor engaging in activism to restore shareholder value. An alternative real
decision is an amplifying action, where the decision makers objective is something other than
rm value, and maximizing this objective leads him to worsen rm value in the low state. For
example, capital providers may withdraw their investment in the low state, reducing rm value
further (Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan (2013)), or customers or employees could terminate
their relationship with a troubled rm (Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001)). Our model pro-
vides distinctive insights on the feedback e¤ect when real decisions are of the corrective nature.
In a model with amplifying actions, the speculator will no longer be reluctant to sell on bad
news if she has a zero initial stake, since the information will reduce rm value further, enabling
her to prot more on her short position.
3.5.5 Other assumptions
Several other assumptions are made only for tractability and can be substantially weakened at
the cost of complicating the model with little additional insight. The rst is that the manager
has no signal and the speculator has a perfect signal about the state of nature . We only require
that the speculator has some important decision-relevant information that the manager does
not have it is not even necessary that the speculator be more informed than the manager.12
Another non-critical assumption is discrete trading volumes (i.e., the speculator cannot
trade an amount between 0 and 1). We conjecture that our results will continue to hold in
more complex models with continuous trading volumes. Our intuition is that in such a model
the speculator would sell a small amount (rather than zero) on negative information without
12For example, assume that the optimal decision d depends on both an internal state variable i about the
rm, and an external state variable e about the industrys future prospects. Assume also that the manager has
a perfect signal about i and the speculator is completely uninformed about i. In addition, the manager has a
noisy signal about e and the speculator has a less precise signal about e which is conditionally uncorrelated
with the managers signal. Even though the manager is more informed than the speculator about both i and
e, as the speculators information about e is still incremental and relevant for his decision.
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signicantly increasing the probability of disinvestment, but she will buy a greater amount upon
good information and so the asymmetry of trading strategies would remain and that is likely
to cause asymmetry in the updating of the manager. In fact, our conjecture is conrmed in a
subsequent paper by Boleslavsky, Kelly, and Taylor (2014).
Relatedly, the role of the transaction cost is to demonstrate how the feedback e¤ect changes
incentives to trade in a tractable and stark way: rather than changing the speculators trading
volume (which requires a signicantly more complex model with continuous trading volumes),
the feedback e¤ect changes the range of transaction costs under which the speculator is willing
to trade a given volume. Here, the transaction cost is necessary to deter informed selling in
the BNS equilibrium in Case 1 because the feedback e¤ect attenuates, but does not eliminate,
trading prots. Thus, the feedback e¤ect alone does not induce the speculator to change her
trading volume from  1 to 0 (the only other non-positive trading amount). As Boleslavsky
et al. (2014) also show, transactions costs are not necessary in a continuous trading frame-
work, because the feedback e¤ect leads to the negatively-informed speculator trading a smaller
amount, rather than not trading at all.13
Finally, while we assume that there is only one speculator, the results will likely continue
to hold in a model with multiple speculators as long as each of them is large enough to have
an e¤ect on the total order ow (and hence on the rms decision). The key ingredient in our
model is that speculators are strategic, which does not require them to be monopolistic.
4 E¤ect of Information on Beliefs and Prices
The previous section demonstrated that the feedback e¤ect increases the prevalence of the
BNS equilibrium, in which a speculator buys on good news and does not trade on bad news.
In this section, we study the implications of the BNS equilibrium in the case of feedback
( 1
2  > 1 , 1 2  <  1). Section 4.1 calculates the e¤ect of good and bad news about the
state on the posterior beliefs q, to study the extent to which information reaches the manager
and a¤ects real decisions. Section 4.2 analyzes the impact of news on prices to generate stock
return predictions.
13Other than added complexity, another di¤erence is that the equilibrium in Boleslavsky et al. (2014) is only
in mixed strategies. Thus, the real decision maker is always indi¤erent between the di¤erent actions he can
take, and so does not gain from using the information in the market.
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4.1 Beliefs
Since the manager uses the posterior belief q to guide his investment decision, we can interpret
q as measuring the extent to which information reaches the manager and a¤ects his actions. In
a world in which no agent observes the state, or in which the manager does not learn from prices
or order ows, the posterior q would equal the prior y = 1
2
. Conversely, in a world of perfect
information transmission, q = 1 if  = H and q = 0 if  = L. Our model, in which information
is partially revealed through prices, lies in between these two polar cases. The absolute distance
between q and 1
2
measures the extent to which information reaches the manager.
Thus far, we have shown that good news received by the speculator has a di¤erent impact
on her trades (and thus the total order ow) than bad news. However, it is not obvious that
this di¤erence will translate into a di¤erential impact on the managers beliefs. The manager is
rational and takes into account the fact that the speculator does not sell on negative information:
Indeed, in the analysis of the BNS equilibrium in the proof of Proposition 1, the manager
recognizes that X = 1 could be consistent with a negatively-informed speculator who chooses
not to trade, and so q (1) equals q (0) (where q (X) denotes the posterior at t = 1 upon observing
order ow X). Put di¤erently, although negative information does not cause a negative order
ow (on average), it can still have a negative e¤ect on beliefs and be fully conveyed to the
manager. Thus, it may still seem possible for good and bad news to be conveyed symmetrically
to the manager by taking into account the speculators asymmetric trading strategy, he can
undothe asymmetry. Indeed, we start by showing that, if we do not condition on the presence
of the speculator, the e¤ects on beliefs of the high and low states being realized are symmetric.
This is a direct consequence of the law of iterated expectations: the expected posterior must
equal the prior.
Lemma 2 (Symmetric e¤ect of high and low state on beliefs at t = 1). Consider the BNS
equilibrium where 1
2  > 1 (and
1 
2  <  1). (i) If  = H, the expected posterior probability of
the high state is qH = (1 )
2
6 3 +
1
3
+ 
3
and is increasing in . (ii) If  = L, the expected posterior
probability of the high state is qL = 1 
6 3 +
1
3
and is decreasing in . (iii) We have q
H+qL
2
= 1
2
:
thus, the realization of state H has the same absolute impact on beliefs as the realization of
state L.
Proof. See Appendix A.
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Of greater interest is to study the e¤ect of the state realization conditional upon the spec-
ulator being present. We use the term good news to refer to  = H being realized and
the speculator being present, since in this case there is an agent in the economy who directly
receives news on the state; bad newsis dened analogously. While the above analysis studied
the e¤ect of the state being realized (regardless of whether the state is learned by any agent
in the economy), this analysis studies the impact of the speculator receiving information about
the state. The goal is to investigate the extent to which the speculators good and bad news is
conveyed to the manager at t = 1. The results are given in Proposition 2 below:
Proposition 2 (Asymmetric e¤ect of good and bad news on beliefs at t = 1). Consider the
BNS equilibrium where 1
2  > 1 (and
1 
2  <  1). (i) If  = H and the speculator is present,
the expected posterior probability of the high state is qH;spec = 2
3
and is independent of . (ii)
If  = L and the speculator is present, the expected posterior probability of the high state is
qL;spec = 1 
6 3 +
1
3
and is decreasing in . (iii) We have
qH;spec + qL;spec
2
=
1 + 1 
6 3
2
; (3)
which is decreasing in . Since
1+ 1 
6 3
2
> 1
2
, (3) implies that
qH;spec   y  qL;spec   y > 0, i.e.
the absolute increase in the managers posterior if the speculator receives good news exceeds the
absolute decrease in his posterior if the speculator receives bad news. The di¤erence is decreasing
in .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2 shows that, conditional upon the speculator being present, the impact on
beliefs of good news is greater in absolute terms than the impact of bad news, and the asymme-
try is monotonically decreasing in the probability of the speculators presence . Even though
the manager takes the speculators asymmetric trading strategy into account, he cannot dis-
tinguish the case of a negatively-informed (and non-trading) speculator from that of an absent
speculator (i.e. no information) both cases lead to the order ow being f 1; 0; 1g with equal
probability. Thus, negative information has a smaller e¤ect on his belief. If the speculator is
always present ( = 1), the manager has no such inference problem and there is no asymmetry.
In sum, due to the reduced incentive to sell that results from the feedback e¤ect, negative
information received by the speculator is transmitted to the manager to a lesser extent than
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positive information. As a result, the manager cannot use this information to guide his invest-
ment decision, with negative real consequences. In particular, even if there is an agent in the
economy (the speculator) who knows for certain that disinvestment is optimal, because  = L,
disinvestment may not occur. The failure to disinvest does not occur because the manager is
pursuing private benets, as in the standard theories of Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990) and Zwiebel
(1996). In contrast, the manager is fully aligned with rm value and there are no agency prob-
lems. The manager wishes to maximize rm value by learning from prices, but is unable to
do so since speculators refrain from impounding their information into prices. Even though he
takes into account the fact that the speculator does not trade on negative information when
updating his beliefs, he cannot fully undo the asymmetry of her trading behavior.
The above analysis considered the change in the managers posterior at t = 1. At t = 2, the
state is realized and the posterior becomes either 1 (if  = H) or 0 (if  = L). Since bad news
is conveyed to the manager to a lesser extent at t = 1, it seeps out to a greater extent ex post,
between t = 1 and t = 2. Thus, bad news causes a greater change in the posterior between
t = 1 and t = 2 than good news. This result is stated in Corollary 1 below:
Corollary 1 (Asymmetric e¤ect of high and low state on beliefs at t = 2). Consider the BNS
equilibrium where 1
2  > 1 , 1 2  <  1. When the speculator is present, the absolute impact
on beliefs between t = 1 and t = 2 of the realization of the state is greater for  = L than for
 = H, i.e. 0  qL;spec  1  qH;spec > 0:
The asymmetry is monotonically decreasing in the frequency of the speculators presence .
Proof. Follows from simple calculations
The smaller e¤ect of bad news on the posterior at t = 1 is counterbalanced by its larger
e¤ect at t = 2. As we will show in Section 4.2, surprisingly this result need not hold when we
examine the e¤ect of news on prices rather than posteriors.
4.2 Stock Returns
We now calculate the impact of the state realization and news on prices, to generate stock
return implications. We study short-run stock returns between t = 0 and t = 1, and long-run
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drift between t = 1 and t = 2. While this analysis is similar to Section 4.1 but studying prices
rather than beliefs, we will show that not all the results remain the same.
4.2.1 Short-Run Stock Returns
Lemma 3 is analogous to Lemma 2 and shows that, unconditionally, the good and bad states
have the same absolute impact on prices, since the market maker takes the speculators asym-
metric trading strategy into account when devising his pricing function. Let p0 denote the ex
antestock price at t = 0, before the state has been realized.
Lemma 3 (Symmetric e¤ect of high and low state on returns between t = 0 and t = 1).
Consider the BNS equilibrium where 1
2  > 1 (and
1 
2  <  1):
(i) The stock price impact of the high state being realized is pH1  p0 = 6 [p (2)  p ( 1)] > 0.
(ii) The stock price impact of the low state being realized is pL1   p0 = 6 [p ( 1)  p (2)] =
   pH1   p0 < 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
We have pH1   p0 =  
 
pL1   p0

: the negative e¤ect of the low state equals the positive
e¤ect of the high state. Thus, the unconditional expected return is zero. This is an inevitable
consequence of market e¢ ciency. The price at t = 0 is an unbiased expectation of the t = 1
expected price in the high state and the t = 1 expected price in the low state. Since both states
are equally likely, the absolute e¤ect of the high state must equal that of the low state.
Proposition 3 is analogous to Proposition 2 and shows that, conditional on the speculator
being present, good news has a greater e¤ect than bad news:
Proposition 3 (Asymmetric e¤ect of good and bad news on returns between t = 0 and t = 1).
Consider the BNS equilibrium where 1
2  > 1 (and
1 
2  <  1):
(i) If  = H and the speculator is present, the average return between t = 0 and t = 1 is
pH;spec1   p0 = 13
 
1  
2

(p (2)  p ( 1)) > 0.
(ii) If  = L and the speculator is present, the average return between t = 0 and t = 1 is
pL;spec1   p0 = 6 (p ( 1)  p (2)) < 0.
(iii) The di¤erence in the absolute average returns between the speculator learning  = H
and  = L is given by:
pH;spec1   p0  pL;spec1   p0 = 13 (1  ) (p (2)  p ( 1)) > 0; (4)
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i.e. the stock price increase upon good news exceeds the stock price decrease upon bad news.
This di¤erence is decreasing in .
(iv) The average return, conditional on the speculator being present, is positive:
pspec1   p0 =
1
3
1  
2
(p (2)  p ( 1)) > 0: (5)
This di¤erence is decreasing in .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 3 states that the average return, conditional on the speculator being present,
is positive i.e., the stock price increase upon positive information exceeds the stock price de-
crease upon negative information (part (iii)). Put di¤erently, if the speculator receives positive
news, this is impounded into prices to a greater degree than if she receives negative news. Since
good and bad news are equally likely, this means that the average return, conditional on the
speculator being present, is positive (part (iv)). As with Proposition 2, the key to this result is
that, even though the market maker is rational, he cannot distinguish the case of a negatively-
informed speculator from that of an absent speculator (i.e., no information). If  = 1, equations
(4) and (5) become zero and there is no asymmetry; the asymmetry is monotonically decreasing
in . Note that the positive average return given in part (iv) is not inconsistent with market
e¢ ciency, because it is conditional upon the speculator being present, which is private infor-
mation. An uninformed investor cannot buy the stock at t = 0 and expect to earn a positive
return at t = 1, because she will not know whether the speculator is present.14
4.2.2 Long-Run Drift
We now move from short-run returns to calculating the long-run drift of the stock price, to
analyze the stock return analog of Corollary 1, i.e., the impact of the state realization on prices
between t = 1 and t = 2.
Corollary 2 (Asymmetric e¤ect of good and bad news on returns between t = 1 and t = 2).
Consider the BNS equilibrium where 1
2  > 1 (and
1 
2  <  1):
14In contrast, Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) nd that bad news is impounded into prices to a lesser degree
than good news, in a way that is inconsistent with market e¢ ciency. Thus, their results imply an actionable
trading strategy that does not require the trader to condition upon the speculators presence.
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(i) If  = H and the speculator is present, the average return between t = 1 and t = 2 is
pH;spec2   pH;spec1 = 13 (RH  RL) > 0.
(ii) If  = L and the speculator is present, the average return between t = 1 and t = 2 is
pL;spec2   pL;spec1 =
(3  2)(RL  RH) + 2(1  )x
3(2  ) ; (6)
which is negative in Case 1, but can be positive or negative in Case 2.
(iii) If (6) < 0, the di¤erence in the absolute average returns between the speculator learning
 = H and  = L is given by:
pH;spec2   pH;spec1   pL;spec2   pL;spec1  = (1  )(RL  RH + 2x)3(2  ) ;
which is positive in Case 2 and negative in Case 1. The magnitude of the di¤erence is decreasing
in .
(iv) Expected rm value at t = 2, conditional upon the speculator being present, is:
pspec2 =
1
2
(RH +RL) +
1
3
(x  c);
and the average return between t = 1 and t = 2 if the speculator is present is:
pspec2   pspec1 =
1
6
1  
2  (RL  RH + 2x),
which is positive in Case 2 and negative in Case 1. The magnitude of the di¤erence is decreasing
in .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Corollary 1 showed that the smaller e¤ect of bad news on beliefs at t = 1 is counterbalanced
by a larger e¤ect on beliefs at t = 2, and so the average increase in beliefs in the short-run is
reversed by an average decrease in beliefs in the long-run. Corollary 2 shows that this need not
be the case for returns: it is possible for bad news to have a smaller e¤ect than good news at
both t = 1 and t = 2, and so the speculators presence can lead to positive average returns in
both the short-run and long-run.
In Case 1, we do have the same result for prices as we do for beliefs the smaller e¤ect of
bad news on prices at t = 1 is counterbalanced by a larger e¤ect on prices at t = 2. This is
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because rm value is monotonic in the state. Thus, the large fall in the beliefs, that arises when
the low state is realized at t = 2, translates into a large fall in the stock price the low state
is bad for rm value. As a result, prices are too high at t = 1, conditional upon the speculator
being present. Miller (1977) similarly shows that prices are too high if bad news is not traded
upon. However, in his model, the lack of trading on bad news results from exogenous short-sales
constraints; here, the reluctance to short-sell is generated endogenously. Note that the long-
term drift in returns does not violate market e¢ ciency. The key to reconciling this result with
market e¢ ciency is that rm value is endogenous to trading. If the speculator sold aggressively
upon observing  = L, the decline in the stock price would lead to disinvestment occurring.
The market is not strong-form e¢ cient in the Fama (1970) sense, since the speculators private
information is not incorporated into prices, but is strong-form e¢ cient in the Jensen (1978)
sense as the speculator cannot make prots on her information. Since she does not trade on her
information, the negative e¤ect of  = L on rm value must manifest predominantly at t = 2.
In contrast, for Case 2, rm value is not monotonic in the state. Thus, while beliefs fall
signicantly at t = 2 when  = L is realized, this does not lead to a large fall in the stock price.
The initial fall in beliefs at t = 1 may lead to the manager disinvesting, and rm value under
disinvestment is higher when  = L than when  = H. Thus, the realization of  = L at t = 2
becomes good news for the stock price. Thus, bad news leads to a smaller decline in prices at
t = 2 as well as t = 1. Put di¤erently, bad news about the state is not necessarily bad news
about rm value, because the manager can take a corrective action that is su¢ ciently powerful
to overturn the e¤ect of the state on rm value.
5 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the e¤ect of feedback from nancial markets to corporate decisions on
a speculators incentives to trade on information. Even if a speculator has negative information
on economic conditions, she may strategically refrain from trading on it, because doing so
conveys her information to the manager. The manager may then optimally disinvest, which
improves rm value but reduces the prots from the speculators sell order. While the feedback
e¤ect reduces the incentive to sell on negative information, it reinforces the incentive to buy on
positive information. Doing so induces the manager to optimally increase investment, enhancing
rm value and thus the protability of her buy order.
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Overall, the feedback e¤ect causes strategic speculators to trade asymmetrically on infor-
mation. By deterring them from selling on negative information, it creates a limit to arbitrage
that reduces the informativeness of prices. Unlike the limits to arbitrage identied by prior lit-
erature, our e¤ect is asymmetric. In addition, it does not rely on exogenous frictions or agency
problems, but is instead generated endogenously as part of the arbitrage process. Thus, even if
speculators have perfect private information and no wealth constraints or trading restrictions,
they may choose not to trade on their information. In addition, our model identies the settings
in which the feedback e¤ect, and thus asymmetric trading, is most likely to exist in practice.
The asymmetry should be stronger if the value created by correct investment decisions is large,
or nancial market trading is more informative. It should be weaker if investment is irre-
versible (e.g. due to a termination fee or rm commitment for an M&A deal), or the managers
investment decisions are motivated by private benets rather than rm value maximization.
Asymmetric trading has implications for both stock returns and real investment. In terms
of stock returns, bad news has a smaller e¤ect on short-run prices than good news, even though
the market maker is rational and takes the speculators trading strategy into account when
devising his pricing function. Interestingly, in contrast to underreaction models, the smaller
short-run reaction to bad news may also coincide with smaller long-run drift, since the manager
can disinvest to attenuate the e¤ect of bad economic conditions on rm value. In terms of real
investment, the manager may overinvest in negative-NPV projects, even though there are no
agency problems and he is attempting to learn from the market to take the e¢ cient decision.
Even though there is an agent in the economy who knows with certainty that the investment
is undesirable, and the manager is aware of the speculators asymmetric trading strategy, this
information is not conveyed to the manager and so the desired disinvestment does not occur.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
This proof only provides material supplementary to what is in the main text.
No Trade Equilibrium NT. The order ows of X =  2 and X = 2 are o¤ the equilibrium
path and the posteriors are given by 0 and 1, respectively, as these are the only posteriors that
satisfy the Intuitive Criterion (as stated in the main text). The order ows of X 2 f 1; 0; 1g
are on the equilibrium path and so the posteriors can be calculated by Bayesrule:
q(X) = Pr(HjX)
=
Pr(XjH)
Pr(XjH) + Pr(XjL) :
We thus have:
q( 1) = (1=3) + (1  )(1=3)
(1=3) + (1  )(1=3) + (1=3) + (1  )(1=3)
=
1
2
;
and q (0) and q (1) are calculated in exactly the same way. Sequential rationality leads to the
decisions d and prices p as given by the Table in the proof in the main text.
We now turn to calculating the speculators payo¤ (gross of the transaction cost ) under
di¤erent trading strategies, which comprises of the value of her nal stake (of  1, 0, or 1 share),
plus (minus) the price received (paid) for any share sold (bought). Under the positively-informed
speculators equilibrium strategy of not trading, we have X 2 f 1; 0; 1g and so her payo¤ is 0.
If she deviates to buying:
 With probability (w.p.) 1
3
, X = 2, and she is fully revealed. Her payo¤ is 0.
 W.p. 2
3
, X 2 f0; 1g, and she pays 1
2
RH+
1
2
RL per share. Her payo¤ is RH (12RH+ 12RL) =
1
2
(RH  RL).
Thus, her expected gross gain from deviating to buying is given by:
1
3
(RH  RL)  NT : (7)
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A similar calculation shows that, if the negatively-informed speculator sells, her expected
gross gain is also given by (7). Thus, if and only if   NT , the no-trade equilibrium is
sustainable. The above calculations apply both in the case of feedback ( 1
2  > 1 and
1 
2  <  1)
and no feedback ( 1
2   1 and 1 2    1).
Partial Trade Equilibrium BNS. The order ow of X =  2 is o¤ the equilibrium path and
the posterior is given by 0. The posteriors of the other order ows are given as follows:
q ( 1) = (1  )(1=3)
(1  )(1=3) + (1=3) + (1  )(1=3) =
1  
2  ;
q (0) =
(1=3) + (1  )(1=3)
(1=3) + (1  )(1=3) + (1=3) + (1  )(1=3) =
1
2
;
q(1) =
(1=3) + (1  )(1=3)
(1=3) + (1  )(1=3) + (1=3) + (1  )(1=3) =
1
2
;
q(2) =
 (1=3)
 (1=3)
= 1:
Under the positively-informed speculators equilibrium strategy of buying:
 W.p. 1
3
, X = 2, and she is fully revealed. Her payo¤ is 0.
 W.p. 2
3
, X 2 f0; 1g, and she pays 1
2
RH+
1
2
RL per share. Her payo¤ is RH (12RH+ 12RL) =
1
2
(RH  RL).
If she deviates to not trading, her payo¤ is 0. Thus, her expected gross gain from deviating
to not trading is  NT (as given by (7)) in the cases of both feedback and no feedback.
Under the positively-informed speculators equilibrium strategy of not trading, her payo¤ is
0. If she deviates to selling:
 W.p. 1
3
, X =  2, and she is fully revealed. Her payo¤ is 0.
 W.p. 1
3
,X =  1. In the case of feedback, she receives 1 
2  (RH   x  c)+ 12  (RL + x  c)
per share, and so her payo¤ is   (RL + x  c) + (1 2  (RH   x) + 12  (RL + x)   c) =
1 
2  (RH  RL   2x). In the case of no feedback, she receives 1 2 RH + 12 RL per share,
and so her payo¤ is  RL + (1 2 RH + 12 RL) = 1 2  (RH  RL).
 W.p. 1
3
, X = 0, and she receives 1
2
RH+
1
2
RL per share. Her payo¤ is RL+(12RH+ 12RL) =
1
2
(RH  RL).
42
Thus, her expected gross gain from deviating to selling is given by:
1
3

1  
2   (RH  RL   2x) +
1
2
(RH  RL)

 T (8)
in the case of feedback, and
1
3

1  
2   +
1
2

(RH  RL)  NF (9)
in the case of no feedback.
Thus, the BNS equilibrium is sustainable if and only if T   < NT in the case of
feedback, and NF   < NT in the case of no feedback.
Partial Trade Equilibrium SNB. The order ow of X = 2 is o¤ the equilibrium path and
the posterior is given by 1. The posteriors of the other order ows are given as follows:
q( 2) = 0
 (1=3)
= 0;
q ( 1) = (1=3) + (1  )(1=3)
(1=3) + (1  )(1=3) + (1=3) + (1  )(1=3) =
1
2
;
q (0) =
(1=3) + (1  )(1=3)
(1=3) + (1  )(1=3) + (1=3) + (1  )(1=3) =
1
2
;
q(1) =
(1=3) + (1  )(1=3)
(1=3) + (1  )(1=3) + (1  )(1=3) =
1
2  :
Under the negatively-informed speculators equilibrium strategy of selling:
 W.p. 1
3
, X =  2, and she is fully revealed. Her payo¤ is 0.
 W.p. 2
3
, X 2 f 1; 0g, and she receives 1
2
RH +
1
2
RL per share. Her payo¤ is  RL + 
1
2
RH +
1
2
RL

= 1
2
(RH  RL).
If she deviates to not trading, her payo¤ is 0. Thus, her expected gross gain from deviating
to not trading is  NT (as given by (7)) in the cases of both feedback and no feedback.
Under the positively-informed speculators equilibrium strategy of not trading, her payo¤ is
0. If she deviates to buying:
 W.p. 1
3
, X = 2, and she is fully revealed. Her payo¤ is 0.
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 W.p. 1
3
, X = 1. In the case of feedback, she pays 1
2  (RH + x) +
1 
2  (RL   x)   c
per share, and so her payo¤ is (RH + x  c)   ( 12  (RH + x) + 1 2  (RL   x)   c) =
1 
2  (RH  RL + 2x). In the case of no feedback, she pays 12 RH + 1 2 RL per share, and
so her payo¤ is RH   ( 12 RH + 1 2 RL) = 1 2  (RH  RL).
 W.p. 1
3
, X = 0, and she pays 1
2
RH +
1
2
RL per share. Her payo¤ is RH   (12RH + 12RL) =
1
2
(RH  RL).
Thus, her expected gross gain from deviating to buying is given by:
1
3

1  
2   (RH  RL + 2x) +
1
2
(RH  RL)

 SNB
in the case of feedback, and NF (as given by (9)) in the case of no feedback.
Thus, the SNB equilibrium is sustainable if and only if SNB   < NT in the case of
feedback, and NF   < NT in the case of no feedback.
Trade Equilibrium T. All order ows are on the equilibrium path and so the posteriors are
given as follows:
q( 2) = 0
 (1=3)
= 0;
q ( 1) = (1  )(1=3)
(1  )(1=3) + (1=3) + (1  )(1=3) =
1  
2  ;
q (0) =
(1=3) + (1  )(1=3)
(1=3) + (1  )(1=3) + (1=3) + (1  )(1=3) =
1
2
;
q(1) =
(1=3) + (1  )(1=3)
(1=3) + (1  )(1=3) + (1  )(1=3) =
1
2  ;
q(2) =
 (1=3)
 (1=3)
= 1:
Under the negatively-informed speculators equilibrium strategy of selling:
 W.p. 1
3
, X =  2, and she is fully revealed. Her payo¤ is 0.
 W.p. 1
3
, X =  1. In the case of feedback, she receives 1 
2  (RH   x) + 12  (RL + x)   c
per share, and so her payo¤ is   (RL + x  c) + (1 2  (RH   x) + 12  (RL + x)   c) =
1 
2  (RH  RL   2x). In the case of no feedback, she receives 1 2 RH + 12 RL per share,
and so her payo¤ is  RL + (1 2 RH + 12 RL) = 1 2  (RH  RL).
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 W.p. 1
3
, X = 0, and she receives 1
2
RH+
1
2
RL per share. Her payo¤ is RL+(12RH+ 12RL) =
1
2
(RH  RL).
If she deviates to not trading, her payo¤ is 0. Thus, her expected gross gain from deviating
to not trading is  T (as given by (8)) in the case of feedback, and  NF (as given by (9)) in
the case of no feedback.
A similar calculation shows that, if the positively-informed speculator deviates to not trad-
ing, her gross gain is  SNB (SNB > T ) in the case of feedback and  NF in the case of
no feedback. Thus, the trade equilibrium is sustainable if and only if  < T in the case of
feedback, and  < NF in the case of no feedback.
We now turn to the range of parameter values in which BNS is the only pure-strategy
equilibrium in the case of feedback. If T   < NT , then the conditions for both the NT and
T equilibrium to exist are violated. In addition, this is also the range where BNS equilibrium
exists. We thus must derive conditions under which the SNB equilibrium does not hold, so
that BNS is the unique equilibrium. There are two cases to consider. (i) If SNB  NT , the
SNB equilibrium never exists, and so T   < NT is su¢ cient for BNS to be the unique
equilibrium. (ii) If T < SNB  NT , the SNB equilibrium exists unless  < SNB. Thus,
BNS is the unique equilibrium if T   < SNB. Combining the two cases gives the range
T   < min(SNB; NT ) in the Proposition.
Proof of Lemma 2
For part (i), if  = H, the expected posterior is given by:
qH = (1  )

1
3
q ( 1) + 1
3
q (0) +
1
3
q (1)

+ 

1
3
q (0) +
1
3
q (1) +
1
3
q (2)

=
1  
3
q ( 1) + 1
3
q (0) +
1
3
q (1) +

3
q (2)
=
(1  )2
6  3 +
1
3
+

3
. (10)
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We have:
@qH
@
=
1
3
+
1
3
 2(1  )(2  ) + (1  )2
(2  )2

=
1
3
"
1 +

1  
2  
2
  21  
2  
#
=
1
3

1 

1  
2  
2
> 0:
The expected posterior is increasing in : if the speculator is more likely to be present, she
is more likely to impound her information into prices by trading.
Moving to part (ii), if  = L, we have:
qL =
1
3
(q ( 1) + q (0) + q (1))
=
1  
6  3 +
1
3
: (11)
This quantity is decreasing in . Even though the speculator does not trade upon  = L if she
is present, her information is still partially incorporated into prices. With  = L, there is a 1
3
probability that the order ow is X =  1. This is consistent with the speculator being absent
(in which case the state may be either H or L) or her being present and observing  = L; it
is not consistent with the speculator observing  = H. The greater the likelihood that the
speculator is present, the greater the likelihood that X =  1 stems from  = L, and thus the
greater the decrease in the market makers posterior. Part (iii) follows from simple calculations.
Proof of Proposition 2
For parts (i) and (ii), we have:
qH;spec =
1
3
(q (0) + q (1) + q (2))
=
2
3
; (12)
qL;spec =
1
3
(q ( 1) + q (0) + q (1))
=
1  
6  3 +
1
3
. (13)
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Note that qH;spec is independent of , but qL;spec is decreasing in . The variable  can a¤ect
the expected posterior in two ways: rst, it can change the relative likelihood of the di¤erent
order ows, and second, it can change the actual posterior given a certain order ow. Since we
are conditioning on the speculator being present, the rst channel is ruled out: conditional on
the speculator being present and  = H, X 2 f0; 1; 2g with uniform probability regardless of ;
conditional on the speculator being present and  = L, X 2 f 1; 0; 1g with uniform probability
regardless of . Turning to the second channel, the only posterior that depends on  is q ( 1):
since X =  1 is inconsistent with the speculator being present and seeing  = H, it has a
particularly negative impact on the likelihood of  = H if the speculator is more likely to be
present. In contrast, X 2 f 2; 2g is fully revealing and so the posterior is independent of ;
X 2 f0; 1g is completely uninformative and so the posterior is again independent of . Since
X =  1 can only occur in the presence of a speculator if she has received bad news, only qL;spec
depends on  but qH;spec does not. Part (iii) follows from simple calculations.
Proof of Lemma 3
We start by calculating p0. With probability 12 , the state will be  = L and there is no trade,
regardless of whether the speculator is present. Thus, X 2 f 1; 0; 1g with equal probability.
With probability 1
2
, the state will be  = H. If the speculator is absent (w.p. (1  )), there is
no trade and we again have X 2 f 1; 0; 1g. If the speculator is present, X 2 f0; 1; 2g. Letting
p (X) denote the stock price set by the market maker after observing order ow X at t = 1,
the price at t = 0 will be the expectation over all possible future prices at t = 1, and is given
as follows:
p0 =

2

1
3
p (0) +
1
3
p (1) +
1
3
p (2)

+

1  
2

1
3
p ( 1) + 1
3
p (0) +
1
3
p (1)

=
1
3

1  
2

p ( 1) + p (0) + p (1) + 
2
p (2)

=
1
6
[3RH + 3RL   2c+ 2x] : (14)
Even though the initial belief y is independent of , the initial stock price p0 is increasing
in , because the speculator provides information to improve the managers decision.
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For part (i), if  = H is realized, the expected price at t = 1 is given by:
pH1 = (1  )

1
3
p ( 1) + 1
3
p (0) +
1
3
p (1)

+ 

1
3
p (0) +
1
3
p (1) +
1
3
p (2)

=
1  
3
p ( 1) + 1
3
p (0) +
1
3
p (1) +

3
p (2)
=
(3  )RH + (3  2)(RL + x)
3(2  )  
c
3
: (15)
Note that:
@pH1
@
=
1
3
p(2)  1
3
p( 1) + 1  
3
@p( 1)
@
=
RH  RL + 2(3  4+ 2)x
3(2  )2 > 0;
i.e., pH1 is increasing in , since the speculator impounds information about the high state into
prices.
Turning to part (ii), if  = L is realized, the expected price at t = 1 is given by:
pL1 =
1
3
(p ( 1) + p (0) + p (1)) : (16)
We have @p
L
1
@
= RL RH+2x
3(2 )2 . If the speculator is more likely to be present, then X =  1 is more
likely to result from  = L. Thus, the price is higher if and only if rm value is higher in this
state, i.e., RL + x > RH   x (Case 2).
The calculations of pH1   p0 and pL1   p0 follow automatically.
Proof of Proposition 3
For part (i), if the speculator receives positive information, she will buy one share and so
the expected price becomes:
pH;spec1 =
1
3
(p (0) + p (1) + p (2)) : (17)
Unlike pH1 (equation (15)), this quantity is independent of , for the same reasons that q
H;spec
(equation (12)) is independent of . The stock return realized when the speculator receives
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good information is thus given by:
pH;spec1   p0 =
1
3
(p (0) + p (1) + p (2))  1
3

1  
2

p ( 1) + p (0) + p (1) + 
2
p (2)

=
1
3

1  
2

(p (2)  p ( 1))
=
1
6
(RH  RL + 2(1  )x) > 0, (18)
and we have
@

pH;spec1   p0

@
=  1
3
x < 0:
Equation (18) is decreasing in , whereas the stock return not conditioning on the speculators
presence, pH1   p0, was increasing in . This reversal is because p0 is increasing in , but pH;spec1
is independent of .
For part (ii), if the speculator is present and receives negative information, we have:
pL;spec1 =
1
3
(p ( 1) + p (0) + p (1)) = pL1 ; (19)
and
pL;spec1   p0 =
1
3
(p ( 1) + p (0) + p (1))  1
3

1  
2

p ( 1) + p (0) + p (1) + 
2
p (2)

=

6
(p ( 1)  p (2)) = pL1   p0 < 0.
Parts (iii) and (iv) follow from simple calculations.
Dropping constants, both equation (4) (the asymmetry between the price impact of good and
bad news) and equation (5) (the average return, conditional on the speculator being present)
become:
(1  )

RH  RL + 2(1  )x
2  

:
Di¤erentiating with respect to  gives:
RL  RH   2(3  4+ 2)x
(2  )2 < 0:
Thus, both equations (4) and (5) are decreasing in .
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Proof of Corollary 2
We start with part (i). If the speculator receives good news, she will buy and the investment
will be undertaken only if the noise trader buys. We thus have pH;spec2 =
1
3
(RH + x  c) + 23RH .
This observation yields:
pH;spec2   pH;spec1 = RH +
1
3
(x  c)  1
3
(p (0) + p (1) + p (2))
=
1
3
(RH  RL) .
Moving to part (ii), if the speculator receives bad news, she will not trade. The rm reduces
investment only if the noise trader sells. We thus have pL;spec2 =
1
3
(RL + x   c) + 23RL. This
yields:
pL;spec2   pL;spec1 = RL +
1
3
(x  c)  1
3
(p ( 1) + p (0) + p (1))
=
(3  2)(RL  RH) + 2(1  )x
3(2  ) ;
which is negative in Case 1, but can be positive or negative in Case 2. Part (iii) follows from
simple calculations. For part (iv), we rst calculate the expected rm value at t = 2 if the
speculator is present, not conditioning on the state. If  = H, investment depends on the order
ow: if X = 2, we have d = 1 and so rm value is v = RH + x  c; if X 2 f0; 1g, we have d = 0
and so v = RH . If  = L, disinvestment depends on the order ow: if X =  1, we have d =  1
and so v = RL + x   c; if X 2 f0; 1g, we have d = 0 and so v = RL. Expected rm value at
t = 2 is thus given by:
pspec2 =
1
2
(RH +RL) +
1
3
(x  c);
and so we have
pspec2   pspec1 =
1
6
1  
2  (RL  RH + 2x),
which is positive if we are in Case 2 and negative if we are in Case 1.
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B Supplementary Appendix: Not For Publication
B.1 Equilibria when rm value is non-monotonic in states: Full
analysis
In this subsection, we consider the case where, if the rm disinvests, its value is higher in state
 = L (RH   x < RL + x). Hence, disinvestment is su¢ ciently powerful to outweigh the e¤ect
of the state on rm value and lead to a higher value in the low state.
The analysis of equilibrium outcomes becomes more complicated in the case of non-monotonicity.
In the core model, where rm value is monotone in the state, a positively-informed specula-
tor always loses money by selling and a negatively-informed speculator always loses money by
buying, since rm value is always higher in state H than in state L. However, now that rm
value may be higher in state L, a positively-informed speculator may nd it optimal to sell and
a negatively-informed speculator may nd it optimal to buy. Hence, there are nine possible
pure-strategy equilibria (each type of speculator positively-informed and negatively-informed
may either buy, sell, or not trade). The following Lemma simplies the equilibrium analysis,
moving us closer to the analysis conducted in the core model.
Lemma 4 (No equilibrium with trading against information). Suppose that RH   x < RL+ x.
Then:
(i) The trading game has no pure-strategy equilibrium where the speculator sells when she
knows that  = H.
(ii) The trading game has no pure-strategy equilibrium where the speculator buys when she
knows that  = L.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
Following the Lemma, there are four possible pure-strategy equilibria, just as in the previous
subsection: NT , T , SNB, and BNS. However, the conditions for these equilibria to hold are
now tighter. The reason that the positively-informed speculator never sells in equilibrium is
that if the market maker and the manager believe that she sells, she cannot make a prot
from selling. However, she still might be tempted to deviate to selling in any of the four
equilibria mentioned above. When she sells, she potentially misleads the market maker and the
manager to believe that the negatively-informed speculator is present, and so to disinvest. Since
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disinvestment is suboptimal if  = H, this decision reduces rm value and causes the speculator
to make a prot on her short position. Hence, for any of the above four equilibria to hold, an
additional condition must be satised to ensure that the positively-informed speculator does
not have an incentive to deviate to selling. Interestingly, the same issue does not arise with the
negatively-informed speculator, as she never has an incentive to deviate to buying. If she does
so, she misleads the market maker and the manager to believe that the positively-informed
speculator is present, and so to (incorrectly) take the investment. This decision reduces rm
value, causing the speculator to incur a loss from selling.15
In analyzing deviations from the equilibrium, another issue that arises in this subsection is
the specication of o¤-equilibrium beliefs. In Case 1, due to monotonicity, the only assumption
that satised the Intuitive Criterion was that an o¤-equilibrium order ow of X = 2 is due
to the positively-informed speculator (and so the posterior is q = 1), while an o¤-equilibrium
order ow of X =  2 is due to the negatively-informed speculator (and so the posterior is
q = 0). In this subsection, however, the Intuitive Criterion is not su¢ cient to rule out other
o¤-equilibrium beliefs. We nevertheless retain this assumption regarding o¤-equilibrium beliefs,
which is reasonable given the possible equilibria in our model. Our results remain the same for
any other o¤-equilibrium beliefs that are monotone in the order ow.16
Proposition 4 provides the characterization of equilibrium outcomes.
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium, rm value is non-monotone in the state). Suppose that RH x <
RL + x, and suppose that the belief of the market maker and the manager is that an o¤-
equilibrium order ow of X =  2 (X = 2) is associated with the presence of negatively-informed
(positively-informed) speculator. Then, if RH  RL is su¢ ciently high compared to x (formally,
RH   RL > 43x), the characterization of equilibrium outcomes is identical to that in Lemma 1
for the case of feedback and Proposition 1 for the case of no feedback.
More specically, the following additional conditions are required for the various equilibria
to hold:
Equilibrium NT :   2
3
(RL  RH + x).
Equilibrium SNB: in the case of feedback,   2
3
(RL  RH + x); in the case of no feedback,
  2
3
(RL  RH + x).
15Goldstein and Guembel (2008) also derive conditions to ensure that the speculator does not deviate from
the equilibrium to trade against her information.
16Other papers that use similar monotonicity assumptions for o¤-equilibrium beliefs include Gul and Sonnen-
schein (1988) and Bikhchandani (1992).
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Equilibrium BNS: in the case of feedback, 6 2
2  x <
12 5
4 2 (RH  RL); in the case of no
feedback, 2
3
x < 12 5
12 6 (RH  RL).
Equilibrium T : in the case of feedback, 4
2 x < 3 (RH  RL); in the case of no feedback,
2
3
x < (RH  RL).
The condition RH  RL > 43x is su¢ cient for all of the above conditions to be satised.
Proof. The calculations of the posterior q, the managers decision d and the price p for di¤erent
order ows X in the various possible equilibria are identical to those provided in the proof of
Proposition 1. Hence, the conditions for the positively-informed speculator to choose between
buying and not trading and for the negatively-informed speculator to choose between selling
and not trading are identical to those derived in the proof of Proposition 1. Analyzing the
possible trading prots for the negatively-informed speculator from deviating to buying in each
of the four possible equilibria, it is straightforward to see that she always loses from buying
and hence will never deviate. Appendix B.3 calculates the possible trading prots for the
positively-informed speculator from deviating to selling in each of the four possible equilibria,
which yields the additional conditions stated in the body of the proposition. These conditions
are automatically satised when RH  RL > 43x.
As Proposition 4 demonstrates, the main force identied in the previous subsection for the
case where RH   x > RL + x, exists also in the case where RH   x < RL + x. That is, the
feedback e¤ect deters informed selling relative to informed buying. In this subsection, this force
is even stronger because the minimum transaction cost required to deter the negatively-informed
speculator from selling in the BNS equilibrium, T  13

1 
2  (RH  RL   2x) + 12(RH  RL)

,
is lower when RH   x < RL + x: the rst term in the expression for T is negative. A strong
feedback e¤ect, in which disinvestment not only mitigates the e¤ect of the low state but also
overturns it, implies that the negatively-informed speculator can make a loss from selling even
before transaction costs. This result is in contrast to standard informed trading models where a
speculator can never make a loss (before transactions costs) if she trades in the direction of her
information. This loss occurs at theX =  1 node. As in the core model, the key to this result is
 < 1. Even though both the speculator and market maker know that disinvestment will occur
if X =  1, they have di¤ering views on rm value conditional on disinvestment. The speculator
knows that disinvestment will occur, and that disinvestment is desirable for rm value (since
she knows that  = L), and so rm value is RL + x  c. In contrast, the market maker knows
53
the disinvestment will occur but is not certain that it is optimal, because she is unsure of the
underlying state . Order ow X =  1 is consistent with a negatively-informed speculator, but
also with an absent speculator and selling by the noise trader. Hence, it is possible that  = H,
in which case disinvestment is undesirable, leading to rm value of RH   x   c. Therefore,
the price set by the market maker is only 1 
2  (RH   x) + 12  (RL + x)   c, since he puts
weight on the possibility that disinvestment may be undesirable, and so the speculator loses
1 
2  (RH  RL   2x) before transaction costs.
Moreover, Proposition 4 also shows that the feedback e¤ect generates an additional force
in this subsection: the desire of the positively-informed speculator to deviate and manipulate
the price by selling. She can potentially prot from leading the manager to divest incorrectly,
which enables her to gain on her short position. The manipulation incentive is not strong
enough to interfere with equilibrium conditions as long as RH  RL is su¢ ciently high relative
to x; a su¢ cient condition is RH   RL > 43x. In this case, the loss from trading against good
news (which is proportional to RH   RL) is high relative to the benet from manipulation
(which is proportional to x, the value destroyed by inducing the manager to divest incorrectly).
Otherwise, additional conditions are required to sustain the various possible equilibria.
B.2 Positive initial position: Full analysis
We now assume that the speculator starts o¤ with a stake of  and can trade s 2 f 1; 0; 1g.
Thus, her nal position becomes f  1; ;  + 1g. Our main result from the core model is that,
under feedback, the range of  that supports the BNS equilibrium is strictly greater than that
which supports the SNB equilibrium. Thus, for conciseness, we consider the case of feedback
( 1
2  > 1 =
1
2
+ c
2x
() 1 
2  <  1 =
1
2
  c
2x
) and analyze only the BNS and SNB equilibria,
rather than the T and NT equilibria.
Buy Not Sell Equilibrium BNS.
Under the positively-informed speculators equilibrium strategy of buying:
 W.p. 1
3
,X = 2, and she is fully revealed. Her payo¤is (+1) (RH + x  c) (RH + x  c) =
 (RH + x  c).
 W.p. 2
3
, X 2 f0; 1g, and she pays 1
2
RH +
1
2
RL per share. Her payo¤ is ( + 1)RH  
(1
2
RH +
1
2
RL) = RH +
1
2
(RH  RL).
54
If she deviates to not trading:
 W.p. 2
3
, X 2 f0; 1g, and her payo¤ is RH .
 W.p. 1
3
, X =  1, and her payo¤ is  (RH   x  c).
Her expected gross gain from deviating to not trading is:
1
3
[2x+ (RH  RL)]  NT :
Under the negatively-informed speculators equilibrium strategy of not trading:
 W.p. 2
3
, X 2 f0; 1g, and her payo¤ is RL.
 W.p. 1
3
, X =  1 and her payo¤ is  (RL + x  c).
If she deviates to selling:
 W.p. 1
3
, X =  2 and she is fully revealed. Thus her payo¤ is (   1) (RL + x  c) +
(RL + x  c) =  (RL + x  c).
 W.p. 1
3
, X =  1 and she receives 1 
2  (RH   x  c) + 12  (RL + x  c) per share. Her
payo¤ is (   1) (RL + x  c) + (1 2  (RH   x) + 12  (RL + x)   c) =  (RL + x  c) +
1 
2  (RH  RL   2x).
 W.p. 1
3
, X = 0, and she receives 1
2
RH +
1
2
RL per share. Her payo¤ is ( 1)RL+(12RH +
1
2
RL) = RL +
1
2
(RH  RL).
Her expected gross gain from deviating to selling is:
1
3

(x  c) + 1  
2   (RH  RL   2x) +
1
2
(RH  RL)

 T :
The BNS equilibrium holds for  2 [T ; NT ].
Sell Not Buy Equilibrium SNB.
Under the positively-informed speculators equilibrium strategy of not trading:
 W.p. 1
3
, X = 1 and her payo¤ is  (RH + x  c).
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 W.p. 2
3
, X 2 f 1; 0g and her payo¤ is RH .
If she deviates to buying:
 W.p. 1
3
,X = 2, and she is fully revealed. Her payo¤is (+1) (RH + x  c) (RH + x  c) =
 (RH + x  c).
 W.p. 1
3
, X = 1, and she pays 1
2  (RH + x) +
1 
2  (RL   x)   c per share. Her pay-
o¤ is ( + 1) (RH + x  c)   ( 12  (RH + x) + 1 2  (RL   x)   c) =  (RH + x  c) +
1 
2  (RH  RL + 2x)
 W.p. 1
3
, X = 0, and she pays 1
2
RH +
1
2
RL per share. Her payo¤ is ( + 1)RH   (12RH +
1
2
RL) = RH +
1
2
(RH  RL).
Thus, her expected gross gain from deviating to buying is:
1
3

 (x  c) + 1  
2   (RH  RL + 2x) +
1
2
(RH  RL)

 SNB:
Under the negatively-informed speculators equilibrium strategy of selling:
 W.p. 1
3
, X =  2, and she is fully revealed. Her payo¤ is (   1) (RL + x  c) +
(RL + x  c) =  (RL + x  c).
 W.p. 2
3
, X 2 f 1; 0g, and she receives 1
2
RH +
1
2
RL per share. Her payo¤ is (  1)RL + 
1
2
RH +
1
2
RL

= RL +
1
2
(RH  RL).
If she deviates to not selling:
 W.p. 1
3
, X = 1, and her payo¤ is  (RL   x  c).
 W.p. 2
3
, X 2 f 1; 0g, and her payo¤ is RL.
Thus, her expected gross gain from deviating to not trading is:
1
3
[2x+ (RH  RL)]  NT .
The SNB equilibrium holds for  2 [SNB; NT ].
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The maximum value of  that supports the BNS and SNB equilibria is the same for both
equilibria (NT ). The transaction cost must be su¢ ciently small to deter the positively-informed
speculator from deviating to not trading in BNS, and the negatively-informed speculator from
deviating to not trading in SNB. Under BNS, the positively-informed speculators motive to
play her equilibrium strategy of buying is that doing so leads to correct investment. Under
BNS, the negatively-informed speculators motive to play her equilibrium strategy of selling
is that doing so leads to correct disinvestment. Since the value created by correct investment
equals the value created by correct disinvestment, these motives are equally strong, thus leading
to the same threshold.
While the maximum value of  must be su¢ ciently low not to deter the positively-informed
speculator from deviating to not buying (under BNS) and the negatively-informed speculator
from deviating not selling (under SNB), the minimum value of  must be su¢ ciently high to
deter the negatively-informed speculator from deviating to selling (under BNS) and positively-
informed speculator from deviating to buying (under SNB). While this minimum is is T for
BNS, it is SNB for SNB. We have
SNB   T =
1
3

[(x  c)  (x  c)] + 1  
2   [(RH  RL + 2x)  (RH  RL   2x)]

(20)
=
1
3
1  
2  4x > 0
Thus, the minimum value is strictly smaller for BNS, and so the range of  that support BNS
is a strict superset of the range that supports SNB  just as in the core model where the
speculator has a zero initial stake.
To understand the intuition, the rst term in the di¤erence (20) is zero, since the value
created by correct investment equals the value created by correct disinvestment. The second
term is positive due to the feedback e¤ect: investment increases the sensitivity of rm value
to the state of nature (which becomes now RH   RL + 2x), and disinvestment decreases the
sensitivity of rm value to the state of nature (which becomes now RH  RL  2x). Due to the
feedback e¤ect, the negatively-informed speculators motive to deviate to selling under BNS is
relatively low, as it may induce the manager to e¢ ciently disinvest and thus reduces the prots
on the share she sells. In contrast, due to the same feedback e¤ect, the positively-informed
speculators motive to deivate to buying under SNB is relatively high, as it may induce the
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manager to e¢ ciently invest and thus increase the prots on the share she buys. Thus, the
minimum transaction cost to deter deviation to trading is higher in SNB than BNS, and the
SNB equilibrium is strictly more di¢ cult to sustain.
Note that the di¤erence SNB   T is independent of the initial stake . While a higher
 increases the speculators incentives to sell on negative information, since doing so increases
the value of her block, it equally increases her incentives to buy on positive information for the
same reason. These two e¤ects cancel out, and so the only di¤erence is the gain on the one
share that the speculator trades. Thus, her initial position does not matter.
B.3 Additional Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4
For part (i), suppose that the speculator sells when she knows that  = H: then X 2
f 2; 1; 0g when  = H. In each of these nodes, the posterior probability q of state H is at
least 1
2
(since these nodes are consistent with the action of the positively-informed speculator and
may or may not be consistent with the action of the negatively-informed speculator, depending
on her equilibrium action). Then the manager will choose d 2 f0; 1g and so rm value is
either RH or RH + x  c. The price, however, will incorporate the possibility that  = L. For
d 2 f0; 1g, rm value is lower under  = L than under  = H. Thus, the price the speculator
receives will be lower than rm value, and so the speculator makes a loss from selling.
For part (ii), suppose that the speculator buys when she knows that  = L: then X 2
f0; 1; 2g when  = L. Given that the positively-informed speculator does not sell, the posterior
probability q is 1
2
at X 2 f0; 1g. Thus, the manager chooses d = 0 and so rm value is RL.
Since the price is 1
2
RH +
1
2
RL, the speculator will lose money on these nodes. When X = 2,
there are two possibilities. If the positively-informed speculator buys in equilibrium, then the
outcome is the same as on the other nodes. If she does not trade in equilibrium, then the
negatively-informed speculator is revealed, buying a security worth RL + x   c for a price of
RL + x  c. Thus, in expectation she makes a loss, given she loses at X 2 f0; 1g.
Proof of Proposition 4
This proof only provides material supplementary to Appendix B.1. As discussed in the main
text, it is straightforward to show that the negatively-informed speculator will not deviate to
buying. Here, we calculate the prots made if the positively-informed speculator deviates to
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selling, to derive the necessary conditions to prevent such a deviation.
No Trade Equilibrium NT. Under the positively-informed speculators equilibrium strategy
of not trading, her payo¤ is 0. If she deviates to selling:
 W.p. 1
3
, X =  2, and her (gross) payo¤ is   (RH   x  c)+(RL + x  c) = RL RH+2x.
 W.p. 2
3
, X 2 f 1; 0g ; and she receives 1
2
RH+
1
2
RL per share. Her payo¤ is  RH+ 12RH+
1
2
RL =
1
2
(RL  RH).
Thus, her overall gross gain from deviating to selling is given by:
2
3
(RL  RH + x)  MNT :
Thus, if and only if   MNT , she will not deviate to selling. The above calculations apply
both in the case of feedback and no feedback. The su¢ cient condition RH   RL > 43x implies
RL  RH + x < 0, and hence the additional equilibrium condition is satised.
Partial Trade Equilibrium BNS. Under the positively-informed speculators equilibrium
strategy of buying:
 W.p. 1
3
, X = 2, and she is fully revealed. Her payo¤ is 0.
 W.p. 2
3
, X 2 f0; 1g, and she pays 1
2
RH+
1
2
RL per share. Her payo¤ is RH (12RH+ 12RL) =
1
2
(RH  RL).
If she deviates to selling:
 W.p. 1
3
, X =  2, and her payo¤ is  (RH   x  c) +RL + x  c = RL  RH + 2x.
 W.p. 1
3
, X =  1, and her payo¤ is   (RH   x  c) + 1 2  (RH   x) + 12  (RL + x)  c =
1
2  (RL  RH + 2x) in the case of feedback and  RH+ 1 2 RH+ 12 RL = 12  (RL  RH)
in the case of no feedback.
 W.p. 1
3
, X = 0, and her payo¤ is  RH + 12RH + 12RL = 12 (RL  RH).
Thus, she will not deviate if
6  2
2   x <
12  5
4  2 (RH  RL)
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in the case of feedback and
2
3
x <
12  5
12  6 (RH  RL)
in the case of no feedback.
In the case of feedback, the condition is equivalent to
RH  RL > 12  4
12  5x:
It is straightforward to show that
4
3
>
12  4
12  5;
and hence the su¢ cient condition RH   RL > 43x implies the additional equilibrium condition
in the case of feedback. A similar argument shows that the additional equilibrium condition is
also satised in the case of no feedback.
Partial Trade Equilibrium SNB. Under the positively-informed speculators equilibrium
strategy of not trading, her payo¤ is 0. If she deviates to selling:
 W.p. 1
3
, X =  2, and her payo¤ is   (RH   x  c) +RL + x  c = RL  RH + 2x:
 W.p. 2
3
, X 2 f 1; 0g, and her payo¤ is  RH + 12RH + 12RL = 12(RL  RH).
Thus, her expected gross gain from deviating to selling is given by:
2
3
[RL  RH + x]  MSNB:
Thus, she will not deviate to selling if and only if   MSNB. It is straightforward to verify
that the condition RH   RL > 43x is su¢ cient for MSNB to be negative and for the additional
equilibrium conditions to be satised.
Trade Equilibrium T. Under the positively-informed speculators equilibrium strategy of
buying:
 W.p. 1
3
, X = 2, and she is fully revealed. Her payo¤ is 0.
 W.p. 1
3
,X = 1. In the case of feedback, she pays 1
2  (RH + x)+
1 
2  (RL   x) c per share,
and so her payo¤ is RH+x c ( 12  (RH + x)+ 1 2  (RL   x) c) = 1 2  (RH  RL + 2x).
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In the case of no feedback, she pays 1
2 RH +
1 
2 RL per share, and so her payo¤ is
RH   ( 12 RH + 1 2 RL) = 1 2  (RH  RL).
 W.p. 1
3
, X = 0, and she pays 1
2
RH +
1
2
RL per share. Her payo¤ is RH   (12RH + 12RL) =
1
2
(RH  RL).
If she deviates to selling:
 W.p. 1
3
, X =  2, and her payo¤ is   (RH   x  c) +RL + x  c = RL  RH + 2x.
 W.p. 1
3
, X =  1. In the case of feedback, she receives 1 
2  (RH   x) + 12  (RL + x)   c
per share, and so her payo¤ is   (RH   x  c) + 1 2  (RH   x) + 12  (RL + x)  c   =
1
2  (RL  RH + 2x). In the case of no feedback, she receives 1 2 RH + 12 RL per share,
and so her payo¤ is  RH + 1 2 RH + 12 RL = 12  (RL  RH).
 W.p. 1
3
, X = 0, and she receives 1
2
RH+
1
2
RL per share. Her payo¤ is  RH+ 12RH+ 12RL =
1
2
(RL  RH).
Thus, she will not deviate if
4
2  x < 3 (RH  RL)
in the case of feedback and
2
3
x < (RH  RL)
in the case of no feedback. The condition RH   RL > 43x implies 3(RH   RL) > 4x 12  and
RH  RL > 23x, and thus the additional equilibrium conditions.
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